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In North Carolina, as in most jurisdictions across the
country, state law requires that charter schools be governed
by nonprofit corporations. This Article examines the
governance practices of a select group of North Carolina
charter-holding nonprofits and asks whether they are
complying with state and federal nonprofit law. It
scrutinizes with particular care a group of North Carolina
charter-holding nonprofit corporations that have entered
into comprehensive management agreements with for-profit
educational management organizations, also known as
EMOs. Based on an exhaustive analysis of the nonprofit
corporations’ board meeting minutes, contracts, financial
reports, tax filings, and real estate records, this Article
concludes that certain North Carolina charter-holding
nonprofits have very likely violated nonprofit law by in
essence handing the keys of the charter schools over to the
for-profit EMOs, permitting them with minimal supervision
or disclosure to convert public educational dollars into
significant corporate profits. This Article calls for legal and
regulatory reform to rein in abusive practices by for-profit
EMOs and more effectively safeguard the public funds that
North Carolina citizens have devoted to education.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1759
A. Charter School Fault Lines ................................................. 1759
B. The Roadmap ....................................................................... 1764
C. Methodology ........................................................................ 1764
I. CHARTER SCHOOLS AND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS ..... 1766
A. Defining Charter Schools .................................................... 1766

* © 2015 Thomas A. Kelley III.
** Thomas A. Kelley is the Paul B. Eaton Distinguished Professor of Law at the
University of North Carolina School of Law. Thanks to Melanie Armstrong, Benjamin
Gurlitz, and Allen Rowe for their invaluable assistance with this paper-heavy research
project.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015)

1758

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

B. Evolution of North Carolina Charter School Laws and
Practices................................................................................ 1769
II. NONPROFIT LAW APPLICABLE TO NORTH CAROLINA
CHARTER SCHOOLS ................................................................... 1772
A. State Nonprofit Law Doctrines........................................... 1772
1. Duty of Care ................................................................... 1773
2. Duty of Loyalty............................................................... 1775
3. Duty of Obedience ......................................................... 1777
4. Board Capture and Weak Enforcement ...................... 1778
B. Federal Nonprofit Law Doctrines ...................................... 1780
1. Private Inurement and Intermediate Sanctions .......... 1780
a. Private Inurement..................................................... 1780
b. Intermediate Sanctions............................................. 1781
2. The Operational Test and the Private Benefit
Doctrine .......................................................................... 1784
a. The Operational Test ............................................... 1784
b. The Private Benefit Doctrine .................................. 1786
III. AN EXAMINATION OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARTER
SCHOOLS’ MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND NONPROFIT
LAW COMPLIANCE ..................................................................... 1790
A. First Category: Schools that Appear To Violate State
and Federal Nonprofit Law ................................................ 1790
1. Description of RBA’s Financial and Management
Practices .......................................................................... 1791
2. The Application of Nonprofit Legal Doctrines to
RBA-Managed Schools ................................................ 1795
a. Private Inurement and Intermediate Sanctions ..... 1795
b. State Law Fiduciary Duties ..................................... 1798
B. Second Category: North Carolina Charter Schools
Operating in Nonprofit Law’s Gray Areas ....................... 1801
1. Description of Financial and Management Practices
of Schools Managed by National Heritage
Academies and Charter Schools USA ........................ 1802
2. Description of Financial and Management Practices
of Schools Managed by Charter Schools USA........... 1812
3. The Application of Nonprofit Legal Doctrines to
Schools Managed by National Heritage Academies
and Charter Schools USA ............................................ 1815
a. Operational Test and Private Benefit Doctrine ..... 1816
b. Fiduciary Duties of Obedience and Care ............... 1818
C. Third Category: Charter Schools that Appear To
Comply with Nonprofit Law .............................................. 1819

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015)

2015]

CHARTER SCHOOLS & NONPROFIT LAW

1759

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 1821

INTRODUCTION
A. Charter School Fault Lines
Depending on whom you ask, charter schools are either saving or
destroying public education in North Carolina and across the United
States. If you believe proponents, charter schools are engines of
educational innovation.1 They are unhindered by state government’s
education-related bureaucratic strictures,2 so they have more
flexibility to hire qualified teachers (and fire those who
underperform) and experiment with pedagogical approaches.3 As
they innovate, charters produce new ideas and new methods that can
be adopted by traditional public schools.4 Crucially, charters provide
enhanced school choice for North Carolina parents, which, according
to proponents, is an unalloyed benefit.5
According to detractors, charter schools divert desperately
needed resources from already underfunded traditional public

1. See, e.g., The Facts on Charter Schools, PUB. SCH. FIRST NC, http://
www.publicschoolsfirstnc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/12-15-14-The-Facts-on-CharterSchools.pdf (last modified Dec. 15, 2014) [hereinafter The Facts on Charter Schools].
2. See id. (stating that North Carolina charter schools are exempt from most
regulations and statutes that apply to other public schools).
3. See Paul T. Hill, Realizing Chartering’s Full Potential, in CHARTER SCHOOLS
AGAINST THE ODDS 179, 187 (Paul T. Hill ed., 2006) (advocating for fewer barriers to
charter schools’ ability to “make innovative use of artists, scientists, mathematicians, and
other masters of key subject matter”); Molly O’Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and
the “Deregulated” Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. REV. 137, 154–55 (2000) (“Charter school
reform advocates assert that charter schools, . . . freed from the reform-stifling politics of
bureaucratic school districts and entrenched teacher organizations, will be better and more
responsive schools. Deregulation is expected to produce flexibility and innovation.”).
4. See O’Brien, supra note 3, at 139 (“Many charter school laws explicitly exempt
charter schools from most state laws and local regulations so that they are free to innovate,
to become laboratories for school reform. The charter school is envisioned as an engine
for system-wide reform and innovation.”); Pedro Noguera, Why Don’t We Have Real
Data on Charter Schools?, THE NATION (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.thenation.com
/article/181753/why-dont-we-have-real-data-charter-schools# (arguing that early charter
school proponents believed charter schools would “serve as a laboratory for innovations
that would then be applied to public schools”).
5. The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1; see also Derek W. Black, Charter
Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445, 449 (2013)
(“[S]ome argue that the greatest public good occurs when everyone is pursuing individual
good because maximizing individual good accrues to the benefit of the whole. Per this
concept, the individual good does not sacrifice the public good but actually serves it.”).
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schools.6 Because, unlike traditional public schools, they are not
required to pay for students’ transportation to and from school,
because they are not required to feed students once they are on
campus, and because they are not required to accommodate children
with special needs,7 they tend to attract those from motivated, often
higher-resourced families, leaving traditional public schools to
grapple with the more challenging and expensive students.8 Critics
add that studies demonstrate that in spite of charters’ operational
flexibility, they perform no better than traditional public schools at
the essential task of educating children.9 Finally, opponents argue that
6. The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1 (arguing that charters divert
resources from traditional public schools); see also Black, supra note 5, at 469–75 (arguing
a significant portion of traditional public schools have been underfunded for some time
and that the rise of charter schools exacerbates that resource problem).
7. Lisa Lukasik, Deconstructing a Decade of Charter School Funding: An Argument
for Reform, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1885, 1889 (2012); see also Letter from the N.C. Justice Ctr.
to the N.C. State Bd. of Educ. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default
/files/M_Ellinwood%20Charter%20Applicant%20Letter%208_30_12.pdf (discussing lack
of transportation provided by charter schools as well as difficulties in serving children with
special needs); The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1 (discussing concerns that
charter schools will fail to meet students’ educational needs).
8. See Lukasik, supra note 7, at 1889 (referring to the fear that North Carolina
charter schools create a “two track system”); see also Jeffrey R. Henig, Charter Inroads in
Affluent Communities: Hype or Turning Point?, in HOPES, FEARS, AND REALITIES : A
B ALANCED L OOK AT AMERICAN C HARTER SCHOOLS IN 2012, at 13 (Robin J. Lake
ed., 2013) (maintaining that even charter schools serving nonaffluent minority
communities had lower proportions of special education, non-English-speaking, and truly
poor students and tended to “crop off” students who cost more to educate); Black, supra
note 5, at 474 (arguing that studies clearly show that charter schools engage in “cropping,”
or discouraging the enrollment of high-need students, which results in a higher burden for
the nearby traditional public schools); Lisa Rab, Getting Schooled: Charter Schools Are a
Booming Business, and North Carolina Has Opened the Floodgates, CHARLOTTE
MAG. (Oct. 2012), http://www.charlottemagazine.com/Charlotte-Magazine/October2012/Getting-Schooled/ (noting that critics accuse charter schools of catering to wealthier,
white children, excluding needier kids and referring to a 2007 University of Michigan
study that concluded that high achievement scores among students in a group of charter
schools merely reflected the fact that the students were of high socioeconomic status). But
see Robin J. Lake, Will the Charter Movement Rest on Its Laurels or Innovate and Expand,
in HOPES, FEARS, AND REALITIES: A BALANCED L OOK AT AMERICAN C HARTER
SCHOOLS IN 2012, at 2 (arguing that concerns about charters focusing on white suburbs
are unfounded because it is a sign that charter schools are becoming widely accepted by a
broad cross section of the public); Noguera, supra note 4 (arguing that many charter
schools accept only the least difficult and therefore least expensive students).
9. Lukasik, supra note 7, at 1889 (citing CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES,
STANFORD UNIV., MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES, at
6 (2009), http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf); see
also Natalie Gomez-Velez, Urban Public Education Reform: Governance, Accountability,
Outsourcing, 45 URB. LAW. 51, 91 (2013) (arguing that “current ‘business model’ reform
efforts that rely on outsourcing and the use of high stakes tests for everything from student
retention to teacher evaluation to school closure have failed to establish improvements in
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the seamy underside of school choice is that charters are leading to
the re-segregation of public schools as parents choose charter schools
populated by people of similar ethnicity, faith, and socioeconomic
status.10
The policy arguments—both pro and con—surrounding charter
schools are often fraught with emotion.11 After all, the well-being of
North Carolina’s children and broader society are at stake. However,
those heated policy arguments are not what this Article is about.
Instead, it will focus on a heretofore unexamined but crucially
important legal issue related to North Carolina charter schools12:
whether they are complying with state and federal laws governing
nonprofit charitable organizations.
In North Carolina, as in most other states with charter schools,
the enabling legislation requires that the charters—the written
agreements that spell out the obligations of school organizers and
student achievement”); RICHARD BUDDIN, THE IMPACT OF CHARTER SCHOOLS ON
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS 6 (CATO Inst., Policy Analysis No. 707,
2012), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/impact-charter-schoolspublic-private-school-enrollments (summarizing various studies that generally conclude
that learning outcomes were no better at charter schools as compared to traditional public
schools); L EAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLA., STATEWIDE STUDY ON SCHOOL
C HOICE AND C ONSENSUS R EPORT ON C HARTER SCHOOLS 12–13 (2014) (concluding,
among other things, that Florida charter schools perform no better and tend to be more
segregated than traditional public schools); Rab, supra note 8 (arguing it is a subject of
great debate whether charter schools perform as well as traditional public schools and
citing the Stanford study concluding that only seventeen percent of charter schools
outperformed public schools).
10. See Henig, supra note 8, at 23 (arguing that charter school supporters generally
admit that charter schools tend not to be diverse but defend them as often “targeting
minority communities”); LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF FLA., supra note 9, at 12
(concluding that charter schools in Florida have increased segregation); Black, supra note
5, at 465–66 (arguing that charter school and voucher programs permit parents to dissent
against integration and pointing out that North Carolina’s Charlotte-Mecklenburg School
District has in the last decade amassed the largest charter school population in the state in
terms of percentage and also has become the most segregated district in the state); Quick
Facts: Charter Schools, P UB. SCH. FIRST NC, http://www.publicschoolsfirstnc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/9-30-14-QUICK-FACTS-Charter-Schools.pdf (last modified Sept.
30, 2014) (citing national studies and North Carolina-specific evidence showing that North
Carolina charter schools tend to be racially isolated and disproportionately serve higher
income students).
11. See Noguera, supra note 4 (claiming recent policy debates over charter schools are
becoming “increasingly acrimonious”); see also O’Brien, supra note 3, at 137–38
(“[D]ecisions about the public school curriculum give rise to particularly heated conflicts
and controversy.”).
12. See Black, supra note 5, at 446 (arguing that most of the discourse regarding
charter schools and vouchers has been about whether they produce better educational
outcomes); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Follow the Money: Charter Schools and Financial
Accountability, 44 URB. L AW. 37, 41–42 (2012) (arguing that most charter school
scholarship focuses on their educational utility).
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grant them the formal right to create and maintain schools using
public funds13—be held by charitable nonprofit corporations.14 In
most cases, those charitable corporations themselves take on the tasks
of planning and running the new schools: developing learning goals
and curricula, hiring and firing administrators and teachers, renting or
purchasing facilities and equipment, and myriad other tasks.15 In some
cases, however, the nonprofit charter-holders turn most or all of the
schools’ educational and administrative functions over to a separate
nonprofit or for-profit company, variously referred to as a charter
management organization (“CMO”) or educational management
organization (“EMO”).16 Often, such management organizations are
regional or national in scope, managing numerous schools in a
number of different states.17 They claim to enhance public education
by introducing innovative curricula and by more nimbly serving the
educational needs of students and families.18 They say not only that
13. See Julia L. Davis, Contracts, Control and Charter Schools: The Success of Charter
Schools Depends on Stronger Nonprofit Board Oversight to Preserve Independence and
Prevent Domination by For-Profit Management Companies, 2011 BYU E DUC. & L.J. 1, 6
(2011) (noting that a charter is a sort of contract that outlines the obligations of the
school).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218.1(a) (2014); see also Davis, supra note 13, at 7
(noting that only a few states allow for-profits to hold charters).
15. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., CMO AND EMO PUBLIC CHARTER
SCHOOLS: A GROWING PHENOMENON IN THE CHARTER SCHOOL SECTOR, at 2 tbl.1,
app. A (2014), available at http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01
/NAPCS-CMO-EMO-DASHBOARD-DETAILS_20111103T102812.pdf (stating that in
the 2009–2010 school year, 71.3% of charter schools were “freestanding” or nonCMO/EMO; for the 2009–2010 school year, 93% of North Carolina charter schools were
“freestanding” (89 out of 96 schools)).
16. The terms CMO and EMO are not employed consistently in charter school
literature. Some commentators use them interchangeably to refer to any management
organization, whether for-profit or nonprofit. Others employ the term CMO to refer to
nonprofit management organizations and EMO to refer to for-profit management
organizations. See, e.g., ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE
OVERSIGHT 6 (2014), available at http://annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files
/CharterAccountabilityStds.pdf (defining CMO and EMO). In this Article, I will follow
what appears to be the trend by referring to “management organizations” when I mean all
such organizations, CMOs or nonprofit management organization when I mean
nonprofits, and EMOs or for-profit management organization when I refer to for-profits.
17. See John E. Chubb, Should Charter Schools Be a Cottage Industry?, in CHARTER
SCHOOLS AGAINST THE ODDS, supra note 3, at 127, 145 (“For the most part [for-profit
EMOs] have concentrated geographically . . . . Yet, some organizations have chosen to set
up shop in many states.”). In 2006, some for-profit CMOs were operating in up to eighteen
states, with EMO’s representing an average of 20.1 schools and CMOs representing an
average of 10.1 schools. Id. at 146.
18. See BRYAN C. HASSEL, THE CHARTER SCHOOL CHALLENGE: AVOIDING THE
PITFALLS, FULFILLING THE PROMISE 131–32 (1999) (“[T]here is evidence that charter
schools link their practices together in comprehensive ‘innovation systems’ to focus on a
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their educational methods are better than traditional public schools,
but also that their management techniques are more effective and
efficient, partly because they adhere to the discipline of the market
and partly because they create economies of scale by purchasing in
bulk and pooling aspects of back-office resources among the many
schools they manage.19
North Carolina law requires charter-holders to be nonprofit
corporations,20 so it stands to reason that those corporations must
comply with state and federal nonprofit law, whether the nonprofit
corporations manage their charter schools independently or contract
out the management functions. However, until now, no one has
carefully examined whether those nonprofit charter-holding
corporations are in fact complying with nonprofit law.21 There has
been legal commentary on whether charter schools and other state
institutions are complying fully with North Carolina’s charterenabling statute,22 and there have been legal debates over whether
charter schools are subject to open meetings and public records
laws.23 But no one has examined North Carolina charter schools
through the lens of nonprofit law. This Article aims to fill that void.

coherent mission . . . . [T]he broader institutional regime through which charter schools
come to be and in which they are regulated is itself a genuine innovation.”).
19. MICHAEL FABRICANT & MICHELLE FINE, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE
CORPORATE MAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: WHAT’S AT STAKE? 32 (2012) (“The
scaling up of charter reform from individual schools to network is widely assumed to be
the only way to ensure the economies of scale necessary to fulfill the infrastructural needs
of charters including . . . billing departments, technology support services, record keeping,
and teacher training that might otherwise be unavailable.”).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218.1(a) (2014).
21. See Frequent Questions, N.C. ALLIANCE FOR PUB. C HARTER SCH.,
http://nccharterschools.org/resources/faqs (last visited Aug. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Frequent
Questions] (discussing various state and federal laws that North Carolina charter schools
must comply with but failing to mention nonprofit law).
22. See, e.g., Lukasik, supra note 7, at 1897–1911 (describing litigation of contested
interpretations of the North Carolina enabling statute’s funding formula).
23. See, e.g., Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir.
2010) (stating that the Arizona Attorney General concluded charter schools were subject
to open meeting laws); Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550,
574 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“The mere opportunity to be present at the end-stage of a behindthe-scenes evaluation process is not the equivalent of having an opportunity to be involved in
the development of the standards, policies, and procedures that will govern that process.”);
Zager v. Chester Cmty. Charter Sch., 934 A.2d 1227, 1232–33 (Pa. 2007) (holding that charter
schools in Pennsylvania are subject to the Right-to-Know Act and are subject to public
disclosure); Ann Doss Helms, NC Education Officials: Charter Schools Must Disclose
Salaries, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news
/local/education/article9113006.html; Ann Doss Helms, Some NC Charter Schools Violate
Open Meetings Law, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver
.com/news/local/education/article9104393.html.
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The Roadmap

This Introduction concludes by describing the Article’s
methodological approach to studying the nonprofit legal compliance
(or noncompliance) of North Carolina charter schools. Part I provides
needed context by briefly describing the history of the charter school
movement in North Carolina and across the United States. It also
summarizes North Carolina’s charter school statute, including
significant recent changes to that law. Part II introduces several key
state and federal nonprofit legal doctrines and offers illustrative
examples of what actions North Carolina charter-holders should be
taking to comply with those laws. At the state level, the legal
doctrines include the nonprofit corporate fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and obedience, and at the federal level, they include the
Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) operational test, the private
inurement doctrine, the private benefit doctrine, and the intermediate
sanctions regime. Part III shares some preliminary observations about
whether a select group of North Carolina charter-holding nonprofit
corporations are in fact complying with those state and federal
nonprofit laws. The Article concludes by arguing that at least some
charter schools are not complying with their nonprofit law
obligations. It also offers a few recommendations about legal and
regulatory reforms that state officials should consider. The Article’s
goal is to provide readers with a rough snapshot of North Carolina
charter schools’ compliance with nonprofit law and to act as an
instructional roadmap to guide nonprofit charter-holding
corporations, and their boards of directors in particular, in the future.
C.

Methodology

As of May 2015, North Carolina has 146 charter schools in
existence, with sixteen set to open for the 2015–2016 academic year
and many more in the near future.24 Whether one applauds or
opposes this rapid growth, the large number of schools means that
one legal scholar, even one working with the aid of a dedicated
research assistant, cannot hope to thoroughly examine the nonprofit
legal compliance of all of them. I therefore bit off a smaller, more
manageable chunk by selecting twenty-one schools for closer
examination.
This Article does not claim to be a scientific, randomized control
study. In fact, the choice of these twenty-one schools was not at all
24. Approved Charter Schools, PUB. SCH. OF N.C., http://www.ncpublicschools.org
/charterschools/schools/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
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random. Because legal compliance is particularly challenging where
nonprofit organizations enter into comprehensive contracts with forprofit entities, I included in my study group all fifteen North Carolina
schools managed by for-profit management organizations. At present,
there are three such companies active in the state: Roger Bacon
Academy (“RBA”), National Heritage Academies (“NHA”), and
Charter Schools USA (“CSUSA”). To draw comparisons between
the legal compliance of for-profit and nonprofit management
companies, I included three North Carolina charter schools managed
by the Knowledge is Power Program (“KIPP”), a nationally
prominent CMO. Finally, I examined three independent charter
schools, but even they were not randomly selected; I chose them for
geographic diversity, but also because all three posted their board
meeting minutes and other corporate documents on their websites.
This public availability not only made my task easier, but also
provided an obvious sign that the organizations are at least somewhat
transparent and, therefore, presumably more likely to be in general
legal compliance.
Once I identified my sample group, I examined as much
information as I could find about each school, relying primarily on
documents available on the public record. Where possible, I
examined IRS Forms 1023 (the form that nonprofit organizations use
to apply for 501(c)(3) status) and recent IRS Forms 990 (nonprofit
organizations’
annual
informational
returns),
articles
of
incorporation, bylaws, conflict of interest policies, CMO or EMO
management contracts, and original applications to the North
Carolina Office of Charter Schools.25
Several nonprofit legal doctrines focus on board members’
deliberative processes, asking, for example, whether they properly
monitor their organizations’ finances, whether they engage in
appropriate comparison shopping, and whether they carefully
scrutinize potential conflict of interest transactions. To gain insight
into these questions, I filed public records requests with each of the
schools, asking them to provide copies of all board and committee
meeting minutes (including the board packets associated with each
meeting), as well as copies of all vendor and service contracts the
organizations had entered into and additional information on the

25. The charter applications, including their appendices, provided a trove of useful
information including draft corporate policies and, for CMO- and EMO-managed schools,
unsigned model management contracts. Unfortunately, the North Carolina Office of
Charter Schools only posts electronic versions of applications filed after 2012.
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schools’ annual projected budgets.26 I spent countless hours combing
through all of this information, assessing the schools’ corporate
governance practices and legal compliance based on my many years
of experience advising and representing charitable organizations and
teaching a law school course called The Law of Nonprofit
Organizations. As mentioned at the start of this discussion, my study
cannot claim to be random, scientific, or comprehensive, but it does
include a thorough examination of a subset of North Carolina
nonprofit charter-holding corporations through the eyes of an
experienced practitioner and academic.
I. CHARTER SCHOOLS AND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
The history of charter schools in North Carolina and across much
of the United States has been marked by bipartisan support, two
decades of rapid expansion, and, more recently, dissention.
A. Defining Charter Schools
Charter schools began to emerge across the United States in the
1990s, and North Carolina was part of the first wave.27 Since those
early days, the number of charter schools has grown dramatically.
During the 1999–2000 school year, there were approximately 1,542
charter schools in the United States, compared to an estimated 6,440
as of the 2013–2014 school year.28 North Carolina charter schools
have followed a similar growth pattern. In the 1997–1998 school year,
the first year that charters were permitted in the state, thirty-four
26. My records request was only moderately successful. Two of the three for-profit
management companies active in North Carolina—CSUSA and NHA—provided all of the
documents I requested. Legal counsel for the third—RBA—initially contacted me to warn that
I would be charged for all of the necessary copying and that it would prove expensive; this in
spite of the fact that all other schools that responded to my request furnished electronic copies
free of charge. Ultimately, RBA furnished no documents, which is not surprising given that it
has waged extended legal battles with at least one North Carolina newspaper to avoid
responding to record requests. See Caitlin Dineen, StarNews Modifies its Public Records
Request of Charter Day School Inc., STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20140820/ARTICLES/140829960/0/search
(describing the newspaper’s ongoing legal battle with Charter Day School, managed by
RBA, to comply with its public records request). Charter schools managed by KIPP, a
nonprofit CMO, were reasonably responsive, as was the independently managed Tiller
Academy. One of my requests failed due to my own clerical error, and two of the
independent schools simply did not respond to my request, though U.S. Postal Service
records indicate that they received them.
27. Lukasik, supra note 7, at 1887–88.
28. Total Number of Charter Schools: 2013–2014 National, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.
CHARTER SCH., http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/overview
/year/2014 (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
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charter schools opened their doors.29 By 2014, there were 148 charter
schools in the state serving almost 70,000 students.30
Charter schools are publicly funded, privately run schools that
are tuition-free for students.31 Since the beginning of the charter
school movement, proponents have justified charters as “allowing
individual choice [that] will stimulate competition among public
schools and eventually result in a general improvement of those
schools.”32 To allow for innovation,33 charter schools are exempt from
most of the rules, regulations, and statutes that apply to other public
schools,34 though they are subject to the same testing requirements.35
North Carolina charter schools, for example, “are not required to
follow state-mandated unit plans or to coordinate their textbook[
selection and purchasing] with the state department of public
instruction.”36 Also, charter schools generally are permitted to “hire
teachers without regard to professional certification or educational
background[,]”37 and are allowed to hire and fire them without
according them the same substantive and procedural protections
enjoyed by teachers at traditional public schools.38 Finally, charters
are not told how to spend their money. They receive their funds in
block grants, and although the boards that govern the nonprofit
charter-holding corporations must account for the money and
regularly audit the schools’ spending, they are free to allocate the
funds as they see fit.39
Charter schools in North Carolina receive taxpayer funds based
on the number of students enrolled, meaning that when a child
transfers from a traditional public school to a charter, the taxpayer

29. The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1.
30. Id.
31. Rab, supra note 8.
32. Andrew Broy, Charter Schools and Education Reform: How State Constitutional
Challenges Will Alter Charter School Legislation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 493, 516 (2001).
33. See id. at 495 (arguing that North Carolina charter schools were originally
considered educational laboratories to test new methods of instruction).
34. See id. at 526–27; The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1.
35. Broy, supra note 32, at 515.
36. Id. at 514.
37. Id.
38. See FABRICANT & FINE, supra note 19, at 82 (“[A]ccording to charter advocates
and their allies, . . . unions have protected incompetent classroom instructors, supported a
tenure system that guarantees lifetime employment to teachers not producing results in
the classroom, resisted new forms of measurable accountability, and lobbied legislators
with substantial resources to protect their interests . . . .”).
39. See Broy, supra note 32, at 514, 528.
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funding follows her.40 Depending on the size of a given charter
school’s student body and the per-pupil spending of the traditional
public schools from which the charter school draws its students,41 a
single charter school can take in many millions of dollars in gross
revenue in a single school year.42
In spite of their access to public funding, charter schools are not
created or regulated in consultation with local school districts or their
elected representatives.43 Groups or individuals who want to open a
charter school must instead submit a detailed application to the newly
created North Carolina Charter Schools Advisory Board.44 The
Advisory
Board
reviews
the
applications
and
makes
recommendations to the state board of education about which
organizations should receive a charter.45 If and when a charter is
granted to the nonprofit applicant, that organization’s board of
directors, which in some instances is elected by school parents and in
others is self-perpetuating, is left to govern the school with
oversight—some would argue loose oversight46—provided by the
North Carolina Office of Charter Schools.47
The original North Carolina charter school legislation was
ratified in 1996 and authorized the establishment of up to one

40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218.105(c) (2014); see also Lukasik, supra note 7, at
1894–98 (advocating for a change in charter school funding to eliminate the comingling of
charter school and traditional public school funding); Rab, supra note 8 (explaining that
charter schools receive taxpayer funds based on the number of students enrolled).
41. See § 115C-218.105(c); Broy, supra note 32, at 512–13 (explaining charter schools’
per-pupil funding formula).
42. See, e.g., Queen’s Grant Cmty. Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax pt. I (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2011) (reporting approximately
$9.4 million in gross revenue).
43. Rab, supra note 8.
44. See § 115C-218(b) (creating the Charter School Advisory Board).
45. Id.
46. See ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, supra note 16, at 12 (arguing that
across the United States monitoring and oversight by state agencies has not kept pace with
the exponential growth in the number of charter schools); Erin Tracy-Blackwood, North
Carolina Charter Schools Poised to Rake in Millions, CREATIVE LOAFING CHARLOTTE
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://clclt.com/charlotte/north-carolina-charter-schools-are-poised-to-rakein-millions/Content?oid=3469335 (arguing that until recently the State Office of Charter
Schools employed only three consultants to monitor 133 schools and now employs eight
consultants to monitor 153 schools, a ratio far below the national average); The Facts on
Charter Schools, supra note 1.
47. Charter Schools, PUB. SCH. OF N.C., OFFICE OF CHARTER SCH., http://
www.ncpublicschools.org/charterschools/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2014) (stating that its
“Division Mission” is to “provide[] leadership to establish and engage a quality charter
school culture resulting in legal compliance, board performance, financial integrity, and
academic excellence”).
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hundred charter schools across the state.48 The law’s express intent
was to provide greater choice and learning opportunities (with special
emphasis on creating opportunities for learning disabled and
academically gifted students), offer new professional opportunities
for educators, and explore novel approaches to teaching and
learning.49 As will be discussed below, that original intent has recently
evolved.
Support for charter schools tends to be bipartisan at both the
state and federal levels,50 though the different ends of the political
spectrum support them for different reasons.51 The political right
applauds charter schools because they promote “school choice” and
facilitate the introduction of market forces, such as competition and
efficiency to public education.52 The left tends to focus on the fact that
charters facilitate community control and can create access to quality
public education for low-income and minority students.53
Given that political control in North Carolina recently switched
to Republican hands for the first time in a century,54 and that the
state’s political climate has been fiercely, even toxically, partisan ever
since,55 it is important to recall that the state’s original charter
legislation was adopted with bipartisan support,56 even if Republicans
and Democrats have disagreed about more recent changes to the
state’s charter legislation.57
B.

Evolution of North Carolina Charter School Laws and Practices

Recent changes to charter school legislation have been rapid and
numerous. For example, in 2011, North Carolina Senate Bill 8
48. The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1.
49. Id.
50. See Davis, supra note 13, at 6–7 (noting that No Child Left Behind legislation,
supported by the Obama administration, creates strong incentives for the creation and/or
expansion of charter schools across the United States).
51. See id.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id. at 6–7.
54. Rab, supra note 8.
55. See, e.g., John Drescher, Drescher: Politics and the School Board, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Sept. 9, 2012, at A1 (describing how, while designed to be
nonpartisan, the North Carolina school board operates in a “partisan manner”); Charles
Meeker & Richard Vinroot, A Needed End to Gerrymandering, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), May 22, 2014, at A17 (discussing how gerrymandering leads to “legislative
gridlock in a toxic polarizing environment”).
56. Frequent Questions, supra note 21 (noting that North Carolina’s public charter
school legislation came about due to the bipartisan leadership of a liberal Senate
Democrat (Wilber Gully) and a conservative House Republican (Steve Wood)).
57. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
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removed the provision that had limited the number of North Carolina
charter schools to one hundred at any given time, creating the
possibility of an unlimited number of charter schools in the state.58
The same bill eliminated limits on charter school enrollment
increases, lowered minimum enrollment numbers (meaning that
nonprofit organizations could operate charter schools even if they had
managed to enroll only a handful of students), and removed
provisions intended to prevent schools from being created to serve
only specific subcategories of students (e.g., gifted students, students
with disabilities, and students of the same gender).59 The bill also
removed the clear expectation that charter schools would be required
to participate in the public school student accountability program.60
Soon after state legislators lifted the hundred-school cap on
charters, they also created the North Carolina Public Charter Schools
Advisory Council (“Advisory Council” or “Council”), mentioned
above, to help oversee the schools and make recommendations to the
Board of Education.61 Fifteen panelists were appointed to the
Advisory Council by Governor Bev Perdue, Republican legislators,
and State Superintendent June Atkinson.62 Critics of this regulatory
structure pointed out that eleven of the Council members were either
charter advocates or had helped run charter schools,63 and that the
Council included members associated with for-profit management
companies whose profits depend partly on the Council’s decisions.64
Once the legislature removed quantitative limits, the number of
charter schools in North Carolina increased rapidly.65 In 2012, the
state board of education approved twenty-three new charter schools.

58. Act of June 17, 2011, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 647, 647–48 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218 (2014)); see also The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1
(summarizing the legislative changes).
59. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 647–48; see also The Facts on Charter Schools, supra
note 1 (summarizing legislative changes).
60. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws at 647. North Carolina’s public school accountability
program tracks the performance of public schools through student testing and compares
achievement levels among schools within the state and across the United States. See
generally Accountability Services, PUB. SCH. OF N.C., http://www.ncpublicschools.org
/accountability/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2015) (aggregating North Carolina testing and
assessment information and links).
61. Rab, supra note 8.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Marian Wang, Charter School Leader Turns Public Education into Private
Profits, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.starnewsonline.com
/article/20141015/ARTICLES/141019827/0/search [hereinafter Wang I].
65. See The Facts on Charter Schools, supra note 1.
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Nine were approved in 2011 as part of a “fast track” process.66 As of
March 2015, the Board of Education granted final approval to sixteen
new charter schools, meaning there soon will be 162 such schools in
the state.67
An important phenomenon that has accompanied the growth in
charter schools is the increasing number managed by charter
management organizations, particularly for-profit management
organizations. According to the National Alliance for Charter
Schools, an organization that advocates for charter schools and
encourages their growth, as of 2010–2011 (the latest year for which
statistics are available), 20.2% of charter schools nationwide were
managed by nonprofit CMOs and 12.3% by for-profit EMOs.68
Across the United States, the most recent trend has been a decrease
in the number of for-profit managed schools, at least partly because
they have been prone to scandal and legislators in jurisdictions such
as Michigan and Pennsylvania have passed laws to more tightly
regulate them.69 But North Carolina appears to be headed in the
opposite direction; since the hundred-school cap has been lifted, and
since decision making regarding new charters has been turned over to
a council that is friendly to CMO- and EMO-managed charter
schools, the numbers appear to be on the rise.70 In recent years, the
Council has approved six new charter schools managed by for-profit
companies.71 Critics are particularly concerned about the rise of
EMO-managed charter schools, fearing that they prioritize profit over
educational outcomes and that, nationwide, their academic
achievement records are poor72—this, at a time when the state’s
66. See id.; Lynn Bonner, State Board Set to Approve ‘Fast Track’ for Charter
Schools and Online Charter Plan, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 3, 2014), http://
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/education/article9160313.html (referring to the
increased use of “fast track” approval for North Carolina charter school operators who
already have proved successful in starting a charter school).
67. List of Approved Charter Schools, supra note 24.
68. Schools by Management Organization: 2010–2011 National, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR
PUB. CHARTER SCH., http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/mgmt
/year/2011 (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
69. See Patrick J. Gallo, Jr., Reforming the “Business” of Charter Schools in
Pennsylvania, 2014 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 207, 230–31 (2014) (“The Pennsylvania General
Assembly has recognized this need for reform and ‘the need to promote more sensible
funding, quality in planning and governance, better fiscal and educational accountability,
and more transparency in operations.’ ”).
70. See Rab, supra note 8.
71. Id.
72. See GARY MIRON ET AL., NAT'L EDUC. POLICY CTR., PROFILES OF FOR-PROFIT
AND NONPROFIT EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS: THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT—2010–2011, at v (2012), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/EMO-profiles-10-11_0.pdf
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regulatory institutions have failed to keep pace with the rapid
growth.73
II. NONPROFIT LAW APPLICABLE TO NORTH CAROLINA CHARTER
SCHOOLS
To the uninitiated, the law of nonprofit organizations can be
confounding because it is derived from a multiplicity of sources: a
blend of state and federal law74 with roots in the laws of trusts,
corporations, and taxation.75 In recent decades, courts and legislators
across the country have added some clarity by increasingly relying on
corporate law (as opposed to trust law), but inconsistency and
confusion persist.76 Determining whether charter schools in North
Carolina are complying with nonprofit law thus requires the
introduction and explanation of several legal concepts. For the sake
of order and simplicity, the following discussion divides the world of
nonprofit doctrines into state and federal, though, as the analysis will
reveal, they often overlap.
A. State Nonprofit Law Doctrines
For historical reasons, most nonprofit organizations in the
United States are formed as corporations.77 As in the for-profit world,
overall responsibility for each corporation rests with its board of
directors.78 Nonprofit commentators generally agree that the board’s
job is not to micromanage the organization’s day-to-day activities, but
to establish and monitor the organization’s mission; hire, evaluate,
and, if necessary, fire the organization’s chief executive; periodically
assess the organization’s overall performance; ensure that its finances
are in order; and, crucially, verify that the organization is in

(reporting that, of the schools managed by for-profit EMOs that had annual yearly
progress ratings in the 2010–2011 school year, 51.8% did not meet state standards).
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. See B RUCE R. HOPKINS, T HE L AW OF T AX-E XEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3
(10th ed. 2011) (listing various state and federal laws that apply to nonprofit
organizations).
75. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate
Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA.
J. B US. L. 347, 351 (2012) [hereinafter Hazen & Hazen [Pa.]].
76. See id. at 352.
77. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: C ASES AND MATERIALS 52 (4th ed. 2010).
78. Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose is Not Good for the Gander:
Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1984–85 (2007).
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compliance with relevant laws.79 These board responsibilities,
imposed by state law, are generally described as fiduciary duties,80
and scholars and practitioners group them into three categories: care,
loyalty, and obedience.81 For reasons discussed below, fiduciary duties
do not lend themselves to bright-line formulae,82 and at least one
leading treatise claims that “[t]he fiduciary obligation is notably
elusive as a concept.”83 Still, North Carolina nonprofit law does assign
fiduciary duties to nonprofit board members and, in fact, interprets
those duties more strictly than many other jurisdictions.84
1. Duty of Care
The duty of care is in essence a duty to pay close attention to the
goings-on of the corporation. Complying with this duty requires at a
minimum that directors show up to board and committee meetings
and read and evaluate the information that staff and other directors
and officers present to them.85 But the duty of care requires board
members to be more than mere passive recipients of corporate
information.86 They also must ensure that the organization is acting
properly and in adherence with the law, and they have a duty to dig

79. See id. (arguing that the “board must monitor management, make decisions
regarding the high-level direction of the organization, and approve its major
transactions”); see also B US. L AW SECTION OF THE N.C. B AR ASS’N & N.C. C TR. FOR
NONPROFITS, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NORTH C AROLINA NONPROFIT
C ORPORATIONS 27–28 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter N.C. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS ]
(arguing that North Carolina law requires board members to oversee operations, insist on
regular reports, and be on the lookout for mismanagement, illegality, or other
improprieties); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate
Directors—Emphasizing Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1845, 1869–70 (2012)
[hereinafter Hazen & Hazen [N.C.]] (stating that the director’s “duty of oversight is
premised on a duty to keep informed and to assure the organization is operating
properly”).
80. It should go without saying that just as for-profit corporations are subject to a
multiplicity of state laws beyond fiduciary duties, so too are nonprofits. To name just a
few, they must comply with labor and employment laws, land use planning and zoning
laws, and—unique to nonprofit organizations—charitable solicitation laws.
81. See Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1861–67 (describing all three
fiduciary duties under North Carolina law).
82. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 349.
83. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 134.
84. See Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1872, 1867–68 (arguing that North
Carolina declined to adopt recent proposed amendments to nonprofit law that would have
narrowed the scope of nonprofit directors’ fiduciary duties and that the state interprets
those duties strictly).
85. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 151–52.
86. Id. at 152 (arguing every director must “take steps to become knowledgeable
about background facts and circumstances before taking action” or approving others’
actions on behalf of the corporation).
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into the facts when they suspect that something is amiss.87 If, for
example, a board member has reason to believe that staff members of
a nonprofit organization are not fully informing the board about an
important operational or financial issue, she has a legal duty to step
in, insist on receiving the relevant information, closely examine the
details, and satisfy herself that the organization is acting properly.88 A
director is permitted to rely on information provided by others, but
only if she reasonably believes that the contents of the report or
expert opinion are accurate, and she honestly assumes that the agents
presenting such reports are doing so within their professional
competence.89
In determining whether a given director has complied with her
duty of care, North Carolina law applies a reasonableness standard,
asking whether a reasonable director in like circumstances would
have acted similarly.90 Often, nonprofit directors’ breaches of their
duty of care arise because they believe that it is bad manners to ask
probing questions of their organizations’ managers, outside experts,
and fellow board members; however, according to the law, ask they
must.91
To provide a simple duty of care example specific to the North
Carolina charter school context, if a director were presented with a
financial report that contained line-item categories so general that she
could not accurately determine what the money was being spent on,
she would have a legal obligation to insist on a more detailed report
with more specific information.
As discussed above in Section I.A, debates concerning North
Carolina charter schools’ legal compliance tend to focus on per-pupil
financial allocations and the proper application of North Carolina’s
open records laws. These discussions overlook the fact that, because
the charter-holding organizations are nonprofit, their directors must

87. Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1870.
88. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 152; Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note
79, at 1870.
89. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 152.
90. Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1861–63 (arguing that some states have
weakened their duty of care standards by focusing more on the director’s subjective state
of mind and whether she believed she was acting reasonably); see also Hazen & Hazen
[Pa.], supra note 75, at 356 (describing the duty of care as “basically a negligence standard
as it requires directors to act in a manner consistent with reasonably prudent directors
under like circumstances”).
91. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 153; see also infra notes 120–24 and
accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of board capture).
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comply with North Carolina’s nonprofit laws, including the fiduciary
duty of care.
2. Duty of Loyalty
While the duty of care focuses on process—asking whether
nonprofit directors have paid sufficiently close attention and sought
out clear information where it was lacking—the duty of loyalty is
substantive, focusing on the director’s motives, purposes, and goals.92
Boiled down to its essence, the duty of loyalty forbids nonprofit
directors from engaging in self-dealing, also referred to as “interested
transactions.”93
Stated more expansively, the duty of loyalty requires a director
to act in the nonprofit organization’s best interests, even if it means
harming her own.94 Not only must the director avoid harming the
corporation, she must avoid using her position to obtain a benefit or
advantage for herself that might more properly belong to the
corporation.95 The paradigmatic example of such a breach is where a
director is on both sides of a business transaction that involves the
nonprofit organization. Imagine, for example, an insurance executive
who serves on a nonprofit board that is shopping for insurance
coverage.96 If the executive uses his position and influence on the
board to steer the insurance contract to his own company and insulate
his company from market competition, he clearly has violated his
duty of loyalty toward the nonprofit.97
This prohibition on self-dealing would, of course, include a
prohibition against a board member using her position to arrange or
approve an unwarranted expenditure of the organization’s assets
(also known as “corporate waste”)98 where that expenditure directly
or indirectly benefits the board member. To take an obvious example
from the charter school context, a director who serves on the board of
a nonprofit charter-holding corporation and who also is a principal of
a for-profit charter management company would be violating his duty
of loyalty if he were to use his influence to steer business and profits
toward his own company without ensuring that the same services

92. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 380–81.
93. Id.
94. Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1849.
95. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 163.
96. See id. at 178–87 (presenting excerpts and analyzing a duty of loyalty case
involving the sale of insurance to a nonprofit organization).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 165 (employing the term “corporate waste”).
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could not be obtained more economically elsewhere. Likewise, it
would be a breach of the duty of loyalty if a director were to actively
assist another director in such conduct.99
It is important to emphasize that in some instances interested
transactions—that is, business transactions that feature one or more
directors on both sides—are not prohibited by state law and in fact
can be a healthy necessity.100 To return to the example of the director
who is also an insurance salesman, it may be that without that board
member’s intervention to persuade his own company to provide
coverage, the organization would not be able to obtain insurance, at
least not at a price it could afford. In such an instance, the director
has reaped no direct or indirect benefit, the nonprofit organization
has not been harmed, and there is no breach of loyalty.
However, any nonprofit organization contemplating such a
transaction should strictly follow a procedure to examine and, in
effect, sanitize the transaction in advance.101 Ideally, the procedure
will be laid out in detail in the organization’s written conflict of
interest policy.102 Typically, the procedure involves the board asking
the interested director for information and requiring him to remain in
the presence of the board to respond to questions and challenges.103
Once the disinterested directors possess sufficient information, they
should ask the interested director to leave while they analyze the
information and decide if the transaction is in the corporation’s best
interests.104 A properly functioning board of directors would not vote
on such a transaction without investigating alternative sources and
engaging in comparative shopping.105 Their investigation and
discussion concluded, the disinterested directors should vote, outside
the presence of any interested directors, on whether the proposed
transaction is in the organization’s best interests.106 Importantly, the
disinterested directors should carefully document all of these

99. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 382.
100. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 165.
101. See id. 186 (referring to duty of loyalty “sanitation” procedures); N.C.
GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS , supra note 79, at 30–31.
102. Neither North Carolina nor federal law requires nonprofit organizations to have
written conflict-of-interest policies, but the IRS encourages organizations to adopt them
and they have become a settled aspect of nonprofit corporate best practice in recent years.
See N.C. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS, supra note 79, at 10.
103. See id. at 30.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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sanitizing procedures in their board meeting minutes in case legal
authorities suspect a breach of loyalty.107
Although state law fiduciary duties are weakly enforced in many
jurisdictions,108 nonprofit organizations and their directors are far
more likely to be pursued for breaches of the duty of loyalty than for
breaches of the duty of care.109 Where duty of care violations often
result in a mere slap on the wrist, blatant self-dealing can lead to
dissolution of the nonprofit organization under state law in addition
to other penalties.110
3. Duty of Obedience
Obedience is the forgotten fiduciary duty.111 Although less well
known, it is a firmly established aspect of North Carolina law112 and is
crucial for the question of charter school nonprofit legal compliance.
The duty of obedience requires nonprofit directors to ensure that
the corporation devotes its resources to achieving its charitable
mission.113 The “directors may not deviate in any substantial way from
the duty to fulfill the particular purposes for which the organization
was created.”114 To illustrate this duty within the context of charter
schools, if the nonprofit charter-holding corporation’s charitable
mission is to provide high-quality education to children, but the
directors allow the corporation to be used for commercial activity and
the generation of excessive profits, they would be straying from their
mission and thereby violating their duty of obedience.
The duty of obedience is particularly crucial to the credibility and
long-term viability of the nonprofit sector as a whole. The general
public assumes that money and other resources given to a charity will
be devoted to fulfilling the organization’s altruistic ends.115 Their
confidence is based partly on the fact that charities are subject to the
“nondistribution constraint”: the requirement that insiders to the
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 125–31 and accompanying text.
109. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 185.
110. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 384; see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ,
supra note 77, at 185–86 (providing examples of the consequences of self-dealing).
111. See Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 388–89 (arguing obedience is not as
well known as other fiduciary duties but is well known by commentators, practitioners,
and courts).
112. Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1864.
113. See id. at 1863; see also Jeremy Benjamin, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’
Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1677, 1679 (2009) (describing the consequences
of mission drift).
114. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 199.
115. Benjamin, supra note 113, at 1685–86.
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corporation not distribute excess revenues among themselves but
instead reinvest it in the organization’s charitable mission.116 But the
public also relies on directors’ compliance with the duty of obedience.
Even if they cannot name the legal doctrine,117 citizens assume that
the individuals governing the organization will adhere to its charitable
purpose.118 When charitable nonprofit organizations drift from their
missions by, for example, allowing themselves to be used for the
generation of profits for insiders, the public loses confidence, not only
in that charity but also in the nonprofit sector as a whole.119
4. Board Capture and Weak Enforcement
Before shifting the focus to federal nonprofit law doctrines that
apply to charter schools, it is important to highlight two additional
points concerning state law fiduciary duties. First, these duties are
sometimes difficult for directors to adhere to because of the
phenomenon of “board capture.” Second, the enforcement of state
nonprofit laws, especially directors’ fiduciary duties, is generally lax.
Nonprofit directors’ independent decision making, and thus their
compliance with state law fiduciary duties, is often undermined by the
belief that board membership is a gentile world and that directors are
impolite if they pose probing, potentially embarrassing questions to
officers, senior staff, or outside experts.120 Studies on nonprofit board
behavior reveal that in this atmosphere, directors rely almost
exclusively on the organization’s senior staff to provide them with the
information they need to make decisions on behalf of the
corporation.121 Directors tend to rubber-stamp nonprofit managers’
proposals without thoroughly debating the effects those proposals
would have on the organization, even when circumstances would
prompt reasonable people to engage in additional investigation.122
Interestingly, and somewhat counterintuitively, nonprofit directors’
deferential tendencies tend to increase along with the net worth of the
organization.123 At the same time, nonprofit managers have come to
expect this deference: they do what they can to prevent boards from

116. Id.
117. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
118. See Benjamin, supra note 113, at 1686.
119. See id. at 1677–79 (arguing there is a crisis of confidence in the nonprofit sector as
a result of organizations drifting from their charitable missions).
120. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 153–54.
121. Mulligan, supra note 78, at 1987–88.
122. See id. at 1987 (citing various studies).
123. Id.
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engaging in independent decision making, and they routinely
complain of “meddling” board members.124
In sum, the internal structure and dynamics of nonprofit
organizations tend not to foster independent decision-making by
corporate boards. As the following discussion reveals, external
enforcement of state law fiduciary duties also tends to be weak.
Enforcement of directors’ fiduciary duties is negatively affected
by the difficulty of obtaining standing to sue for improper board
behavior and the lack of enforcement resources of state attorneys
general. In some jurisdictions, it is theoretically possible for citizens to
bring legal action to punish directors for violating their fiduciary
duties; but to obtain standing, one must show a “special and definite
interest,” which the general public lacks.125 This means, in effect, that
standing is limited to other directors of the organization who, because
of their positions, are considered to have a stake in the organization’s
performance, and thus have the requisite special and definite interest.
But lawsuits by directors against other directors are exceedingly rare,
rendering this potential enforcement mechanism a chimera.126
In most states, the attorney general is granted broad authority to
oversee nonprofit organizations.127 Due to the standing challenges
discussed above, it is often the attorney general or no one when it
comes to the enforcement of nonprofit laws, including fiduciary
duties. However, in most jurisdictions the broad authority to
investigate and punish bad actors in the nonprofit sector is not
matched by resources.128

124. Id. at 1987–88.
125. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 229; see also Hazen & Hazen [N.C.],
supra note 79, at 1878–79 (referring to the difficulty of obtaining standing to sue nonprofit
directors); Mulligan, supra note 78, at 1988 (“Traditionally, enforcement of nonprofit law
has been the purview of the state attorney general.”).
126. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 229. Where nonprofits are formed as
membership corporations, the members generally can obtain standing to sue. Hazen &
Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 411–12 (referring to the possibility of members’ derivative
actions).
127. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 403; see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ,
supra note 77, at 226 (arguing attorneys general represent the public in enforcing the
purposes of the corporation); Davis, supra note 13, at 19.
128. Hazen & Hazen [Pa.], supra note 75, at 408; see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ,
supra note 77, at 228 (arguing that “[s]taffing problems and a relative lack of interest in
monitoring nonprofits makes attorney general oversight more theoretical than deterrent in
most jurisdictions”); Mulligan, supra note 78, at 1991 (arguing “[m]any serious fiduciary
violations simply fail to pique the interest of state attorneys general”).
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This lack of resources (and perhaps interest) is evident in North
Carolina.129 More than a decade ago, around the time I began
teaching The Law of Nonprofit Organizations at the University of
North Carolina School of Law, I spent most of a day on the telephone
trying to determine who at the North Carolina Attorney General’s
office was responsible for enforcing nonprofit law in the state. After
being transferred to many divisions and speaking to many assistant
attorneys general, I determined that one lawyer in the Attorney
General’s Consumer Protection Division was responsible for
nonprofit enforcement, but he was only able to devote a small
percentage of his time to that task.130 In effect, there was virtually no
enforcement of nonprofit law in North Carolina.
Taken together, the phenomena of board capture and attorney
general inattention mean that, too often, no one verifies that
nonprofit charter schools are complying with state nonprofit law. As
the following discussion will demonstrate, the federal government in
the form of the IRS takes a more stringent approach to the
enforcement of nonprofit law applicable to charter schools.131
B.

Federal Nonprofit Law Doctrines

The discussion of federal nonprofit law governing charter schools
begins with private inurement and the closely related intermediate
sanctions doctrine. The latter is sometimes referred to as the “4958
rules,” after the relevant section of the U.S. Treasury Code. We begin
here not because these doctrines necessarily have the most impact on
charter schools, but because they are clearer and more fully
developed than other applicable federal laws.
1. Private Inurement and Intermediate Sanctions
a.

Private Inurement

Charitable nonprofit organizations such as those that hold North
Carolina school charters are prohibited by section 501(c)(3) of the
Treasury Code from engaging in activities that result in inurement of
the organization’s net earnings to insiders such as founders, directors,

129. See Hazen & Hazen [N.C.], supra note 79, at 1879–80 (referring generally to the
lack of nonprofit enforcement resources in the office of the North Carolina Attorney
General).
130. Cf. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 228 (reporting that a recent
telephone survey found that states dedicate a median of one full-time-equivalent attorney
to charity oversight and that seventeen states had no such lawyers at all).
131. See Davis, supra note 13, at 21.
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and officers.132 In simpler terms, individuals who use their positions of
influence within charitable organizations to line their own pockets—
whether through payment of excessive salaries, below-market-rate
loans and other sweetheart deals, noncompetitive bidding, payment
of excess rent, or improper economic gain from the sale or exchange
of property with the exempt organization—violate federal law’s
private inurement prohibition.133
Historically, the IRS was reluctant to find private inurement
violations because there was only one possible penalty—revocation of
exemption for the organization involved, otherwise known as the
nonprofit death sentence—and the Service was loath to kill charities
unless the violation was particularly blatant and severe.134 In 1996, the
extreme nature of this sanction led to a new regulatory scheme that
imposed excise taxes—in effect, fines—on individuals who wield
influence within nonprofit organizations and use that influence to
steer excessive economic benefits to themselves.135
b.

Intermediate Sanctions

This new scheme was called “intermediate sanctions.”136 The
sanctions were intermediate in that they were less harsh than the
nonprofit death sentence but more severe than the mild slap on the
wrist that the IRS too-often meted out for nonprofit insiders’ selfinterested behavior.137 Today, the intermediate sanctions regime has
largely supplanted the more venerable private inurement doctrine.138
Because they have become the IRS’s preferred cudgel for policing
self-interested transactions by insiders, and because, as Part III of this
Article will discuss, at least some charter school actors in North
Carolina are arguably violating these rules, it is worth examining the
new nomenclature they have created as well as their potential sting.

132. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 445; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2013)
(providing charitable tax exemption only if “no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual”).
133. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 445; John D. Colombo, In Search of
Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2006) (arguing the private inurement
prohibition is well established in federal law and that its purpose is to prevent insiders
from “siphoning off” the exempt organization’s assets by means of non-arms-length
transactions).
134. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 445.
135. Id. at 461–62.
136. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1068 (using the name “intermediate sanctions”
but also referring to the rules by their code number, section 4958).
137. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 462–63.
138. Colombo, supra note 133, at 1068.
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Section 4958 provides for excise taxes on any “excess benefit
transaction,” (“EBT”) defined as a transaction in which “the value of
the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration
[] received.”139 The sanctions only come into play when the
transaction in question is between an exempt organization and a
“disqualified person,” also referred to as a DQP, and defined as a
person who during the preceding five years was “in a position to
exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.”140
Stated in plain English, the intermediate sanctions rules, much like
the private inurement doctrine, will punish insiders who use their
positions to line their pockets or “siphon off” the nonprofit
organization’s resources.141
The IRS has additional rules about who does and does not
qualify as a DQP. For example, the DQP category includes family
members of the person with substantial influence.142 Significant for
North Carolina charter schools, it also includes controlled entities:
corporations or partnerships where more than thirty-five percent of
the voting power is held by DQPs.143 The most obvious examples of
DQPs are nonprofit corporate officers, directors, trustees, and their
close relatives, but the category encompasses anyone, regardless of
title, who is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the
organization.144
The definition of DQP is important because those are the people
subject to the most extreme financial sanctions. If a DQP is found to
have engaged in an EBT, she first must “correct” the excess benefit
within a specified period of time, meaning she must pay back the illgotten gains and restore the charitable organization to the financial
position it would have been in if she had been acting under the
highest fiduciary standards.145 In addition to “correcting” the
transaction, she must pay an initial penalty of twenty-five percent of
139. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2013).
140. Id. § 4958(f)(1)(A); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(a)(1) (2002) (defining a
DQP); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 462–64 (discussing sanctions).
141. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1067–68 (arguing that a “DQP” is similar to
private inurement’s “insider,” and the definition of “excess benefit transaction” means, in
essence, “siphoning off” the organization’s resources).
142. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(B), (f)(4); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(b)(1) (defining
categories of DQPs); F ISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 464 (describing categories
of DQPs).
143. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(C), (f)(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(b)(2) (defining
categories of DQPs); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 464 (describing categories
of DQPs).
144. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 464.
145. See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(6); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(c)(2).
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the excess benefit.146 The DQP, not the organization, must pay the
penalty, and if she fails to do so she may be liable for an additional
second-tier penalty of 200% of the excess benefit.147
But that is not all. Financial penalties also may be imposed on
one or more of the organization’s “managers” who knowingly permit
the organization to engage in an EBT.148 Organization managers
include officers, directors, trustees, and individuals with similar
powers or responsibilities regardless of their titles.149 If they
knowingly, willfully, and unreasonably approve of or otherwise
participate in an EBT, they may be fined up to the lesser of ten
percent of the excess benefit or $20,000.150 If two or more managers
share responsibility for approving the prohibited transaction, they will
be held jointly and severally liable.151
From the perspective of nonprofit charter-holding corporations
in North Carolina, the upshot of these section 4958 rules is that if any
individuals affiliated with the schools’ vendors—the companies that
provide their books, sports equipment, school facilities, teacher
training, back-office administration, or a single company that
provides all of these goods and services—has influence over the
organization, whether as a result of a formal board position or not,
that person and every member of the board of directors could be
personally subject to harsh financial penalties if the vendor is
receiving more than market pay for the goods and services provided.
Before leaving the topic of section 4958, three additional features
of the intermediate sanctions regime bear mentioning. First, although
the intermediate sanctions regime has become the IRS’s favored
means of punishing self-interested transactions by nonprofit
corporate insiders, the IRS reserves the right in extreme cases of
wrongdoing to invoke the private inurement doctrine to kill the
nonprofit organization.152 Second, the law explicitly provides that the
Service will be more understanding and less likely to invoke the death

146. I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1); see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 463
(explaining the initial penalty of an EBT).
147. I.R.C. § 4958(b); see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 463
(explaining the liability of an EBT).
148. I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2); see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 463
(describing the lesser penalties that can be imposed on managers).
149. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(2).
150. Id. § 4958(a)(2), (d)(2).
151. Id. § 4958(d)(1).
152. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 463; Colombo, supra note 133, at
1083.
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penalty where the organization identifies and corrects the EBT before
the IRS discovers it.153
Finally, a nonprofit organization—including a charter school—
can create a legal presumption of propriety for a transaction, even a
transaction with a corporate insider/DQP, if it follows certain vetting
procedures laid down by IRS regulations. Charter schools would be
well advised to seek expert counsel on how to vet and sanitize any
suspect transaction, but for purposes of this Article it must suffice to
say that they should engage in thorough research to ensure that the
amounts of money being paid to the insider/DQP are comparable to
what they would pay on the open market,154 and to debate and vote
on the approval of the transaction without the participation of anyone
who might have a personal interest.155 Even if they follow these
procedures, charter schools can still be found liable for intermediate
sanctions, but the burden of proof in this instance shifts to the IRS,
making prosecution less likely.156
2. The Operational Test and the Private Benefit Doctrine
The operational test and the private benefit doctrine, although
separate, are conceptually related and sometimes blend together at
the margins.157 Combined, they are the doctrines that the IRS most
often applies in the charter school context,158 and therefore, are the
federal doctrines about which North Carolina charter schools should
be most concerned.
a.

The Operational Test

The IRS’s operational test is a gateway that all aspiring 501(c)(3)
organizations must pass through if they wish to earn charitable taxexempt status.159 The test is firmly grounded in the Treasury code and
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(iii) (2013).
154. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i) (2002) (providing that a nonprofit board will have
appropriate comparability data “if, given the knowledge and expertise of its members, it
has information sufficient to determine whether . . . the compensation arrangement is
reasonable or a property transfer is at fair market value”).
155. Id. § 53.4958-6(a)(1) to (3).
156. See id. § 53.4958-6; FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 468.
157. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 459 (arguing the private benefit
doctrine is closely related to the operational test).
158. See Charter School Reference Guide, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/charter
_school_reference_guide_12-2006.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2015); Charter School Guide
Sheet, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/charter_school_guide_sheet_12-2006.pdf (last
visited Aug. 16, 2015).
159. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1081 (arguing that the operational test is at the
heart of tax exemption decisions).
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regulations, and requires that the organization engage “primarily in
activities which accomplish one or more of [the] exempt purposes
specified in section 501(c)(3).”160 There are eight permissible exempt
purposes laid down by section 501(c)(3),161 but the categories
applicable to charter schools are “educational” and “charitable.” To
restate the operational test within the context of North Carolina
charter schools, a charter-holding nonprofit corporation will fail if
more than an insubstantial part of its activities are in furtherance of
something other than its charitable and educational purpose.162
One obvious example of an impermissible activity that would
violate the operational test would be a charter-holding nonprofit
organization distributing its net earnings to a small group of private
individuals.163 This is so because, by definition, a nonprofit
organization cannot be charitable if it does not serve a broad
charitable class, and a small group of private individuals is not a
charitable class.164
It is important to emphasize that even if an organization has
many activities that further legitimate exempt purposes, the
organization will fail the operational test if it serves even a single
substantial private interest.165 To again illustrate the operational test
in the context of North Carolina charter schools, if a charter-holding
nonprofit organization were discovered to be using its resources to
enrich private individuals rather than serve its educational purpose, it
would fail the test and forfeit its tax-exempt status.

160. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2013); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77,
at 317.
161. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2013) (listing permissible exempt purposes as religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, fostering national or
international sports competition, and prevention of cruelty to children or animals).
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 317.
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2). Other obvious examples would be 501(c)(3)
organizations that engage in substantial lobbying or any amount of political campaign
activity because neither of those activities is charitable.
164. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii); see also Andrew Megosh et. al, Private Benefit Under
IRC 501(c)(3), in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2001, at 135, 136–37 (2001), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich01.pdf (explaining nonprofits lose exemption “if
private interests are served other than incidentally”).
165. Megosh, supra note 164, at 137; see also Better Bus. Bureau of Washington, D.C.,
Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 282–84 (1945) (ruling that the presence of private
benefit, if substantial in nature, will preclude 501(c)(3) exemption regardless of an
organization’s other charitable purposes or activities).
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The Private Benefit Doctrine

The private benefit doctrine is broader and more demanding
than the operational test and should be of particular concern to North
Carolina charter schools, especially those that enter into
comprehensive management contracts with for-profit companies.166
Section 501(c)(3) does not explicitly mention the private benefit
doctrine;167 instead, the doctrine’s origins are in the common law rule
that a charitable trust must be formed for the benefit of a large and
indefinite charitable class rather than for specific private individuals168
and in IRS regulations related to the operational test, discussed
above, that state that an organization is not operated exclusively for
exempt purposes “unless it serves a public rather than a private
interest.”169 From these humble origins the IRS and courts have
developed a multi-faceted and powerful, if not always predictable and
consistent, legal doctrine for policing transactions by nonprofits that
benefit private, noncharitable interests.170
An illustration of the doctrine’s most venerable and mundane
application, one that I often use with my Nonprofit Law students, is
that one cannot obtain charitable tax exemption for purposes of
raising money for an individual or family afflicted by cancer.
Although combatting cancer is laudable and fits within any
reasonable definition of charity, the class of recipients in that case
would be too narrow and would thus violate the private benefit
doctrine.
By the late 1970s, however, the IRS was using the private benefit
doctrine not only to police the size of organizations’ charitable
classes, but also to scrutinize whether charitable organizations’

166. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1064 (arguing that the IRS “relie[s] heavily on
the private benefit doctrine to police economic transactions between tax-exempt charities
and for-profit entities”).
167. See id. at 1068; Megosh, supra note 164, at 135.
168. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 459; Colombo, supra note 133, at
1069 (arguing that private benefit traditionally referred to a lack of a sufficiently broad
charitable class).
169. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (providing that 501(c)(3) organizations must
serve “a public rather than a private interest” and also demonstrate that the organization
“is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated
individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests”); see also FISHMAN &
SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 459 (describing the private benefit limitation); Megosh, supra
note 164, at 135 (explaining that the language of 501(c)(3) limits private benefit).
170. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1064 (arguing that the IRS “relie[s] heavily on
the private benefit doctrine to police economic transactions between tax-exempt charities
and for-profit entities”).
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benefits were impermissibly flowing to private individuals outside of
the charitable class.171 During that era, it was becoming increasingly
common for charitable nonprofit organizations to enter into
contractual business arrangements and joint ventures with for-profit
entities,172 and the IRS deployed the private benefit doctrine to
ensure that those relationships were not being used, intentionally or
negligently, to funnel charitable dollars into businesses’ coffers.173
Despite the IRS’s more frequent and expansive use of private
benefit, the agency has never clearly defined it.174 The closest it came
was in 1987 when a General Counsel Memorandum declared that an
organization does not qualify for 501(c)(3) status:
[I]f it serves a private interest more than incidentally . . . .
A private benefit is considered incidental only if it is incidental
in both a qualitative and a quantitative sense. In order to be
incidental in a qualitative sense, the benefit must be a necessary
concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large,
i.e., the activity can be accomplished only by benefitting certain
private individuals . . . . To be incidental in a quantitative sense,
the private benefit must not be substantial after considering the
overall public benefit conferred by the activity.175
An example of the IRS’s application of this expanded version of
private benefit came in the context of its investigation of nonprofit
credit counseling organizations. The Service found that many such
organizations “violated the private benefit doctrine because [their]
operations directly benefitted [for-profit] back-office service
providers with whom [they] had contractual arrangements to [offer]
debt consolidation loans, credit repair services, buying clubs, downpayment assistance,” and various other financial products.176 The IRS
determined that the credit counseling nonprofits had entered into
exclusive deals with the for-profit providers, effectively offloading

171. Id. at 1070.
172. See generally Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis
of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2459–62 (2005)
(arguing the United States charitable sector began commercializing rapidly during the
Reagan administration).
173. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1071–72 (describing how private benefit became
the IRS’s primary tool for policing the boundaries between nonprofit and for-profit
organizations when they entered into joint ventures and partnerships).
174. Id.
175. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
176. Colombo, supra note 133, at 1080.
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most of the actual services and generating significant profits that
ended up in the for-profits’ bank accounts.177
Applying the terms of the 1987 General Counsel Memorandum,
the private benefits flowing to the for-profit organizations were not
quantitatively incidental because the for-profit firms were reaping
significant profits.178 Neither were the private benefits qualitatively
incidental because the charitable organizations could not prove that
the charitable activity could only be accomplished in ways that
created the substantial private benefit—in other words, that the
quantitatively substantial private benefit was unavoidable.179 The IRS
found no reason to believe that the nonprofit organizations could not
have provided the same counseling services more efficiently if they
had managed the programs themselves,180 and, therefore, revoked the
organizations’ exempt statuses.
There are crucial differences between the older doctrines
(private inurement and the traditional version of private benefit) and
this newer, more expansive version of private benefit. One is that an
organization such as a nonprofit credit counseling firm—or a charterholding nonprofit corporation—might be serving a large enough
charitable class, but still violating the doctrine because it is also
substantially benefitting entities or individuals outside the charitable
class.181 Another is that, unlike private inurement, private benefit
does not require that payments for goods or services be unreasonable
or exceed fair market value.182 Finally, unlike private inurement, the
new private benefit doctrine does not require proof that board
members are intentionally steering resources away from charitable

177. Id.
178. See id.; see also Megosh, supra note 164, at 137 (arguing that in determining what
is quantitatively incidental one also must consider the number of entities benefiting
because “if all of an organization’s business dealings are with a single entity (or group of
related entities), or promoter or developer, private benefit is more likely to be present”).
179. See Megosh, supra note 164, at 137 (arguing “qualitatively incidental means that
the private benefit is a mere byproduct of the public benefit”).
180. The result in the credit counseling cases can also be articulated in operational test
terms because the IRS found that the nonprofit organizations had violated the operational
test’s “primary purpose” requirement: the nonprofit organizations were no longer
primarily pursuing charitable ends and no longer primarily undertaking charitable
activities because they had become more concerned with serving the private interests of
the for-profit “back-office” providers than providing services to those in need. See
Colombo, supra note 133, at 1080; see also supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text
(discussing the operational test). In essence, the organizations had become “for-profit[s] in
disguise.” Colombo, supra note 133, at 1082.
181. Megosh, supra note 164, at 136–37.
182. See id. at 138 (citing Est of Hawaii v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 1067 (1979)).
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activities,183 or that the charity is being used as a front by a for-profit
company to procure resources184 (though both of those instances
would furnish strong proof of private benefit). To find a private
benefit violation, it suffices to show that the directors of the charity
are negligently failing to conserve charitable assets by entering into
transactions, even arms-length transactions, that cause an unnecessary
outflow of assets to noncharitable interests.185 The IRS will be more
likely to find such negligent diversion of charitable assets where a
charity fails to follow normal business practices by, for example,
relying too heavily on a single vendor for the goods and services it
needs, or failing to compare prices before making significant
purchases.186
To summarize, nonprofit charter-holding corporations are
subject to various state and federal nonprofit laws. At the state level,
the charter-holders—their boards of directors in particular—should
be concerned about violating the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
obedience. Overall enforcement of state nonprofit law is lax in North
Carolina, but directors are more likely to be prosecuted for duty-ofloyalty violations than for violations of the duty of care or obedience.
The federal government’s enforcement of nonprofit law is more
robust than North Carolina’s, and charter-holding corporations
should be concerned about the application of the private inurement
doctrine, the intermediate sanctions regime, the operational test, and
183. Id.
184. See Colombo, supra note 133, at 1097 (arguing that in some instances of private
benefit enforcement, the IRS appears concerned that the charitable organization is being
used as a front to funnel charitable assets to for-profit businesses in order to increase their
market share and enhance their profits).
185. See id.; Megosh, supra note 164, at 138.
186. Megosh, supra note 164, at 140. One example of private benefit being applied to a
charity’s arms-length transaction is revealed by Judge Richard Posner’s pithy opinion in
the case of United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999). There, a
nonprofit board of directors negotiated a contract for fundraising services with a for-profit
firm. Id. at 1175. The terms of the contract were overwhelmingly favorable to the forprofit, allowing it to raise millions of dollars in revenues, much of which went into its own
pockets. Id. at 1175–76. Judge Posner rejected (incorrectly, in my view) the IRS’s claim
that the fundraising firm’s contract gave it so much power that it had become an insider to
the charity and thus liable for private inurement. Id. at 1176. However, in a puckish bit of
dictum in the opinion’s closing paragraphs, he gave strong reason to believe that the IRS
would have prevailed if it had brought its claim under the private benefit doctrine. Id. at
1179. He implicitly endorsed the notion that impermissible private benefit could occur in
cases where managers of nonprofit organizations unwisely entered into economically
inefficient business transactions with for-profit firms. Id. Stated otherwise, nonprofits that
fail to responsibly conserve their charitable assets by paying too much to for-profit firms
may in extreme circumstances violate the private benefit doctrine and thereby be subject
to loss of exemption. Id. at 1179–80.
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the private benefit doctrine. As the following discussion will illustrate,
nonprofit charter-holders are at particular risk under those state and
federal doctrines where they enter into comprehensive management
contracts with for-profit companies.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARTER SCHOOLS’
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND NONPROFIT LAW COMPLIANCE
This Section divides my sample of North Carolina charter
schools into three roughly hewn categories. The first comprises
schools for which there is strong indication of noncompliance with
state and federal nonprofit law. Legal authorities should investigate
these schools’ operations aggressively. A second category of charter
schools is operating in the gray areas that abound in nonprofit law as
a result of its many “facts and circumstances” and “all the factors”
tests.187 These schools approach, and in some cases appear to cross
over, the lines of acceptable nonprofit behavior. State and federal
regulators should examine these schools’ practices with care, paying
particular attention to their possible noncompliance with the federal
private benefit doctrine and state law duties of obedience and care. A
third group of schools in my sample appears generally to be
complying with nonprofit law. They operate with a reasonable degree
of transparency and regularly take steps to ensure that the public
funds entrusted to them are spent efficiently on the provision of
charitable and educational services.
The following sections consider each of these categories in turn,
beginning with a discussion of arguably noncompliant schools and
ending with a brief description of several that appear to be doing
things correctly. As attentive readers will ascertain, most of the
dubious nonprofit behavior takes place among charter schools
managed by for-profit companies.
A. First Category: Schools that Appear to Violate State and Federal
Nonprofit Law
Three of the schools in my sample show distressing signs of
noncompliance with nonprofit law: Charter Day School (“CDS”),
Columbus Charter School, and Douglass Academy. It should not be
surprising that operations at these three schools are similar, and

187. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (arguing the private benefit doctrine
has vague standards); see also Kelley, supra note 172, at 2476–82 (criticizing the IRS for
using an unpredictable “all the factors” test in connection with the commerciality
doctrine).
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similarly troubling, because they are formally governed by a single
nonprofit board of directors of CDS, which in turn is comprehensively
managed by a single for-profit company, Roger Bacon Academy
(“RBA”).188
1. Description of RBA’s Financial and Management Practices
Obtaining detailed information on RBA-managed charter
schools proved challenging. Unlike other EMO-managed schools in
my sample, all of which responded to my public records requests
within a reasonable period of time by furnishing electronic copies of
board minutes, board packets, financial reports, and vendor contracts,
the RBA-managed schools gave me nothing. As I later discovered,
RBA’s reluctance to share information fits a pattern; it has resisted
similar records requests from news organizations and, as a result, has
been embroiled in related lawsuits.189
In spite of the reticence of the RBA-managed schools to divulge
details of their finances and operations, I was able to form an opinion
regarding their nonprofit legal compliance by examining the schools’
websites, IRS Forms 990 (at least those that were publicly available
on Guidestar.com), and the charter applications filed by the more
recently established schools.190 I also benefitted from the fact that
StarNews, a newspaper that covers southeastern North Carolina, the
region in which RBA charter schools are clustered, made its own
public records requests and obtained access to at least some
documents.191 Based on RBA’s limited response to StarNews’
requests, and on the paper’s own investigative reporting, it published
a series of articles that revealed much about RBA and the schools

188. RBA also manages South Brunswick Charter School. I did not examine that
school’s records in detail because it did not begin operating until summer 2014, which is
when I began researching this Article.
189. Dineen, supra note 26; see also Gareth McGrath, StarNews Drops Charter School
Lawsuit in New Hanover, but Will Refile in Brunswick, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington
Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20141209/ARTICLES/141209723/0
/search?p=3&tc=pg (discussing a lawsuit in response to CDS’s failure to respond to
records requests); F.T. Norton, Charter Day School Gets More Time to Respond to
StarNews Lawsuit, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Oct. 15, 2014), http://
www.starnewsonline.com/article/20141015/ARTICLES/141019815/0/search (discussing the
grant of an extension to CDS for the records request).
190. The North Carolina Office of Charter Schools now posts on its website electronic
versions of aspiring schools’ charter applications. However, the earliest such applications are
from 2012. See Charter Applications, PUB. SCH. OF N.C., http://www.ncpublicschools.org
/charterschools/applications/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
191. Dineen, supra note 26.
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that it manages.192 My analysis relies in part on the information
revealed in those articles.
RBA was founded and is owned by a controversial, outspoken
individual named Baker Mitchell,193 who moved to North Carolina in
the mid-1990s with the express purpose of taking advantage of the
state’s new charter school legislation.194 Mitchell also owns a for-profit
property leasing company, Coastal Habitat Conservancy, whose
primary activity is leasing real property and equipment to charter
schools.195
From the time of CDS’s establishment as a nonprofit corporation
in 1999 until 2013, Mitchell served as a voting member of its board of
directors.196 In 2013, the North Carolina Office of Charter Schools
told him that it would not approve additional charters for CDS unless
he relinquished his position.197 Although Mitchell resigned, or in his
words, “[took] a leave of absence”198 from his position as voting
director, he retained his position as board secretary, which means that
he is and always has been in charge of producing and maintaining all
of CDS’s corporate paperwork including board meeting minutes.199
Mark Dudeck, who is the chief financial officer of Mitchell’s for-profit
companies,200 joined Mitchell on CDS’s board, serving as its treasurer
and registered agent.201
According to an investigative report that analyzed some of
CDS’s board meeting minutes, Mitchell typically did not formally
vote on matters in which he and his companies had an interest, but he
often participated in and even directed the discussions that led up to
the votes.202 Even after his resignation from the board, he reportedly
192. See, e.g., Caitlin Dineen & Pressley Baird, Bacon Academy Management
Company Earns Millions from Schools, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington June 29, 2014),
http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20140629/ARTICLES/140629683/0/search.
193. See Gareth McGrath, Charter Day School Inc. Maintains Contentious Posture on
Oversight, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.starnewsonline.com
/article/20141021/ARTICLES/141029943/0/search.
194. See Wang I, supra note 64.
195. See McGrath, supra note 193.
196. Id.
197. See Wang I, supra note 64 (arguing Mitchell resigned from the board after state
officials told him CDS would not receive approval for an additional charter school unless
he did so).
198. See McGrath, supra note 193.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see also Wang I, supra note 64 (arguing CDS board members were frustrated
by Mitchell’s continuing involvement in CDS governance). An interested director can end
meetings in which interested transactions are discussed without violating any law or
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continues to take an active role in corporate governance and, in his
ongoing role as secretary, produces the written records of those
discussions.203
Over the years, RBA helped establish additional charter schools
in North Carolina, but rather than forming new boards of directors
for each of the new schools, it consolidated governance control by
having the existing CDS corporation apply for the new charters. This
means that the small governing board204 that once oversaw only CDS
now has oversight responsibility over all RBA-managed schools.205 It
also means, of course, that the two interested directors, Mitchell and
Dudeck, who served for many years on the CDS board, exercised
influence over all of the schools.
Together, the RBA-managed charter schools receive enormous
amounts of public money. Although Mitchell has fought to keep most
of the financial details secret,206 an investigative report that examined
his first two schools’ audited financial statements determined that
together they collected almost $20 million over a six-year period
ending in 2013.207 During the 2013–2014 school year alone, three
RBA-managed schools—CDS, Columbus Charter School, and
Douglass Academy—collectively received more than $13 million in
total revenues.208
It is impossible to know precisely how much Mitchell and his
companies are taking home in profits,209 but it is fair to surmise the
returns are generous. The management contract between RBA and
each of the schools declares that RBA is entitled to a fee of sixteen
percent of total revenues, plus additional incentive payments based
on student achievement.210 So, for example, during the 2013–2014

breaching a fiduciary duty. It is only when an interested director exercises control or
intimidation over the vote that a violation could result.
203. See McGrath, supra note 193.
204. See Board of Trustees, CHARTER DAY SCH., http://charterdayschool.net/leadership/
board-of-trustees/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2015) (listing five members of the board of
directors).
205. See id. (listing four charter schools governed by the CDS board of directors).
206. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
207. Wang I, supra note 64.
208. Dineen & Baird, supra note 192.
209. Wang I, supra note 64.
210. See Educational Service Provider Agreement Between Roger Bacon Academy
and Douglass Academy §§ 6.03, 6.10 [hereinafter Douglass-Bacon Agreement],
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/charterschools/resources/application/2014apps
/douglassacademy.pdf (naming RBA’s management fee as sixteen percent of total revenue
and providing for performance-based incentive payments); Dineen & Baird, supra note
192.
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school year, two of the schools paid RBA almost $2.4 million in fees
and incentives out of just under $13 million in total revenue.211
However, focusing exclusively on management fees significantly
understates the amount of money flowing through CDS and into
RBA’s coffers. Lease payments for real estate are a large source of
RBA’s revenue. During the 2013–2014 school year, for example, CDS
and Columbus Charter School paid Coastal Habitat Conservancy, an
RBA-affiliate controlled by Mitchell, approximately $1.5 million to
rent their facilities, plus nearly $549,000 for maintenance.212
In addition to leasing its real estate from a Mitchell-controlled
company, the schools rent or buy practically everything else they need
from either RBA or Coastal Habitat Conservancy: books, furniture,
desks, computers, teacher training, and sports equipment.213 To focus
on one sample, CDS’s 2010 Form 990 reported the details of business
transactions it entered into with “interested persons,”214 and said that
it engaged in six such payments, including a $1.6 million management
fee, $550,000 for “staff development and supervision,” $170,000 for
“back office support,” $965,000 for “building rent – classrooms,”
$83,000 for “building rent – admin offices,” and $318,000 for “misc.
equipment rental.”215 Based on this evidence, CDS paid insiders
(presumably the companies controlled by Mitchell) at least $3,686,000
in a single year. CDS’s 2011 Form 990 shows payments to interested
parties rising to $4,137,000.216 Best of all, at least from the perspective
of RBA and Coastal Conservancy, these insiders never have to wait
for their money. Under Article VI of the management agreement
between CDS and RBA, CDS is obligated to establish a joint bank
account and deposit all revenues within three days of receipt.217 RBA

211. Dineen & Baird, supra note 192 (noting also that the third RBA-managed
school’s management fee was waived amidst a state investigation into low enrollment).
212. Id.
213. McGrath, supra note 193; see also Caitlin Dineen, Baker Mitchell Companies
Benefit Directly from Charter Day Nonprofit He Started, STARNEWS ONLINE
(Wilmington June 29, 2014), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20140629/ARTICLES
/140629682 (“[D]ocuments provided by the Charter Day School Inc. shows [sic] that the
nonprofit group owns very little, if any, of the land, buildings, furniture or equipment used
by its three schools. Instead, the schools rent most of their material goods from founder
Baker Mitchell’s two for-profit companies—Roger Bacon Academy and Coastal Habitat
Conservancy.”); Dineen & Baird, supra note 192 (same).
214. See Charter Day Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax pt. IV (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2010).
215. Id.
216. Charter Day Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax pt. IV (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2011).
217. See Douglass-Bacon Agreement, supra note 210, § 6.01.
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can draw from that account whenever it desires to pay itself or its
affiliates, and in whatever amount it wishes.
It is significant that nothing in CDS’s corporate minutes indicates
that the goods and services that Mitchell’s for-profit companies sold
or leased to CDS were subject to any competitive bidding,
comparative shopping, or price negotiation.218 A passage from CDS’s
2010 Form 990 is particularly revealing in this regard.219 In response to
a question about whether CDS had engaged in any EBTs (meaning
they had paid too much for a good or service provided by a DQP)220
during the previous fiscal year, CDS responded that it had not, and
that “the LLC consistently compares prices against the rent paid to
Coastal Habitat Conservancy.”221 In other words, the response
indicated that CDS’s governing board was not verifying that the
prices being charged were fair, but “the LLC”—meaning RBA—
was.222 The upshot is that, with seemingly little inquiry or input from
the charter schools’ independent directors, representatives of the forprofit management company decided what was reasonable to charge
for the services they provided.
2. The Application of Nonprofit Legal Doctrines to RBA-Managed
Schools
a.

Private Inurement and Intermediate Sanctions

Although the devil is in the details—details that RBA appears
determined not to reveal—evidence exists to indicate private
inurement violations arising out of the management of the three
schools governed by the CDS board of directors. There can be no
doubt that at least two insiders to the CDS board of directors—Baker
Mitchell and Mark Dudeck223—have been on both sides of numerous,
218. See Wang I, supra note 64.
219. Charter Day Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax pt. III (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2010).
220. See supra Section II.B.1.b.
221. Charter Day Sch., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax pt. V (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2010).
222. See Dineen, supra note 213 (reporting that in CDS’s early years, Mitchell signed
most bid documents on behalf of Coastal Habitat and RBA and an illegible signature
signed for the school; after Dudeck joined the RBA about seven years ago, he began
signing the documents); see also Wang I, supra note 64 (arguing that when CDS was first
trying to obtain federal tax exempt status, it furnished the IRS with assurances that its
facility lease was evaluated for fairness by an independent real estate professional when in
fact that professional worked for the same real estate firm as the board chair’s husband).
223. One could argue that RBA itself has become an insider to CDS as a result of its
comprehensive control over all aspects of CDS’s operations and finances. In accordance
with this argument, payments from CDS to RBA and its affiliates would be considered
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substantial financial transactions that amount to many millions of
dollars.224
It is possible, of course, that all of the charitable dollars paid by
CDS to Mitchell’s for-profit companies were properly vetted by the
CDS board of directors with no influence by Mitchell or Dudeck, and
it is possible that all of those transactions were in fact fair, even
beneficial, to CDS.225 It is also possible that disinterested CDS
directors maintained careful records of their factual investigations
and deliberations concerning potential conflict of interest transactions
involving Mitchell and Dudeck, and that they simply do not wish to
share those records in spite of their legal obligation to do so.226
But evidence indicates otherwise. Mitchell is reported to have
participated in and even led board discussions that ultimately
approved these self-interested arrangements.227 There is nothing to
indicate that disinterested directors at CDS took action to verify that
the organization was getting a fair deal for the goods and services
being provided by insiders Mitchell and Dudeck. Therefore, it is
reasonable to suspect that Mitchell and Dudeck were doing exactly
what the private inurement doctrine forbids: using their influence to
steer excessive economic benefits to themselves, or, in slightly more
vernacular terms, lining their own pockets with charitable dollars.228
The IRS is unlikely to pursue CDS for private inurement because
the only possible punishment is loss of exempt status,229 which would
unfairly harm the children that attend the school and the community
that surrounds it. Instead, intermediate sanctions are a more probable
avenue of inquiry.

insider transactions and subject to private inurement scrutiny. A similar argument was
rejected by Judge Posner in United Cancer Council v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th
Cir. 1999), but I believe Judge Posner’s private inurement analysis in that case was flawed.
Because the IRS’s newer intermediate sanctions laws leave little doubt that RBA could
qualify as a DQP, it is unlikely that the IRS or anyone else will challenge RBA (or Judge
Posner’s decision) by pursuing this theory.
224. See supra notes 196–216 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Section II.A.2, II.B.1.a (discussing the requirements of the state law
duty of loyalty and federal private inurement requirements).
226. See supra Section II.B.1.a (discussing federal private inurement requirements).
227. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Section II.B.1.a. Even if CDS could produce board meeting minutes
purporting to show that the insider transactions were properly investigated and approved
by disinterested directors, a thorough investigator would treat such records with at least
some skepticism given that Mitchell himself acts as the board’s secretary and thus
presumably has a large hand in creating the organization’s paper trail.
229. See supra Section II.B.1.a.
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Mitchell and Dudeck, the affiliated for-profit companies with
which they are associated, and the directors and other principals of
CDS, should be concerned about the IRS’s intermediate sanctions
rules because violation can lead to cripplingly large financial
penalties, particularly in instances such as this one where millions of
dollars are flowing through a charitable organization and ending up in
the pockets of DQPs.230 Based on Mitchell’s long-term position on
CDS’s board of directors, his years of holding the office of corporate
secretary, and indications that he takes an active role in guiding and
governing the organization, there is little doubt that he qualifies as a
DQP for intermediate sanctions purposes. Because the status of DQP
does not depend on formal titles, it would make no difference for
intermediate sanctions purposes that Mitchell recently resigned as a
voting director,231 especially since evidence indicates that he retains
not only his officer position but also his influence over the
organization.232 Dudeck, who within the statute’s five-year look-back
period also has served as a voting board member and treasurer of
CDS, would also almost certainly qualify as a DQP. Finally, assuming
Mitchell controls more than thirty-five percent of RBA and Coastal
Habitat Conservancy, they too would be considered DQPs.233
The remaining question would be whether any or all of the
transactions entered into between CDS and the for-profit companies
constituted EBTs. CDS’s board of directors can shift the burden of
proving the existence of an EBT to the IRS if CDS’s disinterested
board members engaged in statutorily required comparison-shopping
to determine whether CDS received value for the charitable dollars it
turned over to DQPs.234 However, nothing on the available record
indicates that such vigorous comparison-shopping took place.
If the IRS determines that CDS has overpaid for any or all of the
services it has received from RBA, Coastal Habitat Conservancy, and
any other affiliated for-profit companies, the financial consequences
could be severe. Many millions of public, charitable dollars have
flowed through CDS during the previous five years.235 If some of
those millions constituted excess benefit payments, the IRS could
compel the DQPs—the individuals, the companies, or both—to pay
230. See supra Section II.B.1.b (describing DQP); see also supra notes 210–16 and
accompanying text (describing the dollar volumes flowing through CDS).
231. See supra Section II.B.1.b (noting that DQP status does not depend on formal
titles).
232. See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text.
233. See supra Section II.B.1.b.
234. See supra Section II.B.1.b.
235. See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text.
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back the overcharges plus a fine calculated as twenty-five percent of
the excess benefits.236 If the remaining, disinterested directors are
shown to have knowingly, willingly, and unreasonably permitted
those transactions to take place, they too could be fined up to a
maximum of $20,000.237
b.

State Law Fiduciary Duties

Although the leaders of CDS and the for-profit companies that
animate it should be most concerned about the application of federal
law, their actions could also be subject to sanction under North
Carolina law. If, for example, Mitchell and Dudeck have used their
influence over the CDS board of directors to steer excessive
charitable and public dollars to their for-profit companies and,
indirectly, to themselves, they obviously would be in violation of their
fiduciary duty of loyalty.238 If the disinterested directors on CDS’s
board failed to investigate and, where warranted, challenge the
insider transactions carried out by Mitchell and Dudeck, they
arguably would be in violation of their fiduciary duty of care.239
Finally, if indeed charitable dollars intended for CDS’s educational
mission were impermissibly diverted into the coffers of RBA and its
affiliates and converted into profits for its principals, all of the board
members would be in violation of their fiduciary duty of obedience.240
Mitchell clearly does not like probing questions or criticism,241
and he is not shy about justifying his actions, particularly when others
have accused him, his associates, and the institutions he controls of
impermissible behavior. In response to allegations that he was
engaged in conflicts of interest, his response was “[u]ndue influence,
blah blah blah.”242 He apparently was not aware that, as a director of
a nonprofit corporation, he was subject to legal duties under federal
and state law to be scrupulously attentive to conflicts of interest.
Mitchell further argues that there is nothing impermissible about
reaping significant corporate profits from charter school
236. See supra Section II.B.1.b.
237. See supra Section II.B.1.b.
238. See supra Section II.A.2.
239. See supra Section II.A.1.
240. See supra Section II.A.3.
241. See Gareth McGrath, Baker Mitchell Sues Pruden over Criticism of Charter
Schools, STARNEWS ONLINE (Wilmington Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.starnewsonline.com
/article/20150109/ARTICLES/150109714/0/search (reporting on a lawsuit he filed against a
critic); supra note 189 and accompanying text (describing Mitchell’s reluctance to comply
with requests for information).
242. Wang I, supra note 64.
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management. To Mitchell, his schools are simply an example of the
triumph of the free market. He has been quoted as stating derisively
that “[p]eople here think it’s unholy if you make a profit” from
schools.243 “In a free-market capitalistic society, the quality of results
determines success or failure and ensures efficiency in the delivery of
goods and services.”244 Referring to himself in the third person, he has
said “[m]aybe Baker Mitchell gets a huge profit. Maybe he doesn’t
get any profit. Who cares?”245
Once again, if Mitchell had been briefed by his attorneys on the
basics of nonprofit law, he would realize that several different
doctrines, most notably and obviously in his case the federal
intermediate sanctions doctrine, the federal private inurement
doctrine, and North Carolina fiduciary duties of loyalty and
obedience, place upon him and his fellow directors a legal obligation
to care how big his companies’ profits are.246
As a corollary to the argument that no one should care about his
and his companies’ profits, Mitchell has argued that all that matters is
that RBA is providing quality education to the students who attend
the schools it manages.247 The proof is in the pudding, he claims,
because his students typically perform better on standardized tests
than students at nearby traditional public schools.248 This argument
again ignores the fact that he and his colleagues on the nonprofit
board are subject to legal obligations to take into account not just the
charitable and educational outcomes, but whether those outcomes are
being achieved without wasting charitable public dollars.249
243. Id.
244. McGrath, supra note 193.
245. Wang I, supra note 64.
246. Mitchell’s attitude betrays a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of
the nonprofit sector. As I often tell my Nonprofit Law students, “We the People,”
meaning the tax-paying members of the public, are silent third parties in transactions
between charitable and for-profit organizations. Most citizens who pay taxes, and who
through the tax code subsidize the activities of charitable organizations such as CDS, have
little or no opportunity to evaluate whether our money is being spent wisely and
efficiently. That is why we entrust legal authorities, namely the IRS and states’ attorneys
general, to monitor those transactions and look out for our interests.
247. McGrath, supra note 193.
248. See Wang I, supra note 64.
249. See supra Section II.A.3 (describing the duty of obedience). In addition, although
it is for the most part legally beside the point—nonprofit directors simply cannot waive
away concerns about private inurement and related legal doctrines by pointing to positive
outcomes—it bears mentioning that Mitchell arguably overstates the quality of his schools’
educational achievements. Critics allege that Mitchell’s schools engage in the cream
skimming described in Part I of this Article, meaning they enroll comparatively low
percentages of needy students whose standardized test scores tend to be lower. See Wang
I, supra note 64. To take one example, in 2014, thirty-seven percent of test takers at the
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Finally, Mitchell has responded to allegations of his and his
companies’ self-serving behavior by claiming that the companies are
responsive to and firmly under the control of the charter schools and
their board. As he is fond of saying, “parents can shut us down
overnight. They stop bringing their kids here? We don’t get any
money.”250 This assertion, while technically true, ignores the reality of
the comprehensive contractual relationship between the nonprofit
schools and the for-profit management companies.
In fact, to fire RBA would be to commit institutional suicide.
Under the terms of the contract that the RBA-managed schools have
signed, all of the millions of dollars in public funds that flow to the
schools are made almost immediately available to the management
company, which has the power to spend those funds in any way it
chooses so long as it provides the promised educational services.
Instead of using those funds to purchase goods on behalf of the
school—land, buildings, furniture, computer equipment, books, and
everything else that goes into educating children—RBA takes the
money and, on behalf of the school, rents or leases to the school all of
those necessary inputs.251 From whom does it lease the goods and
services? From RBA and its for-profit affiliates, of course!252
This means that if the board of directors grew dissatisfied, either
with the quality of RBA’s services or with the extent of its profittaking, and decided to discontinue the relationship, they would be left
with absolutely nothing: no teachers, no curriculum, no school
building, no land, no books, no sports equipment, nothing.253 To
illustrate the aftermath of firing RBA, one can visualize the scene in
the 1960s television program, Dr. Seuss’ How The Grinch Stole
Christmas, when the Grinch stuffs the Christmas tree up the chimney
at Cindy Lou Who’s house and steals away into the night. All he
RBA-managed Columbus Charter School were “economically disadvantaged,” compared
to the county’s seventy-four percent. Id. This low percentage of economically
disadvantaged students is at least arguably by design, since Columbus Charter School does
not provide transportation or a federally supported free and reduced-price lunch program
for its students—both of which are necessary if a school is to attract lower-income
students. Id.
250. Wang I, supra note 64.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. See Jennifer Dixon, Public Money for Schools Buys Private Property, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2014/12/14
/charters-national-heritage-academies-tax-dollars-school-contents/20357559/ (arguing that
a for-profit management company’s ownership of both the school building and its contents
means charter school boards have “little leverage to remove the company if they are
unhappy with [its] stewardship”).
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leaves behind is a “crumb that was even too small for a mouse.”254
The schools governed by CDS would find themselves similarly
stripped if they were to challenge or fire RBA, which renders
doubtful Mitchell’s claim that they are capable of independent
oversight.255
To conclude the discussion of North Carolina charter schools
whose practices are of doubtful rectitude when examined through the
lens of nonprofit law, it should be emphasized that RBA-managed
schools are not the only ones with compliance problems. To take one
example, recent news reports indicate that an independent charter
school in Kinston, North Carolina had its charter suspended for
grossly negligent financial practices that led to insolvency.256 In a
similar vein, I recently heard an anecdote from a reporter who asked
a rural North Carolina independent charter school for copies of its
recent Forms 990. School officials responded that the Office of
Charter Schools took care of all the paper work for them. Obviously,
they were not well informed about their duties under nonprofit law.
Thus, although the RBA-managed charter schools are not alone
in their dubious nonprofit law compliance, they are the only ones in
my sample. Charity regulators, particularly the IRS, should bring
their investigative power to bear to determine if in fact the law is
being broken.
B.

Second Category: North Carolina Charter Schools Operating in
Nonprofit Law’s Gray Areas

Two clusters of North Carolina charter schools fall into this
second category, and each cluster is managed by a for-profit EMO.
National Heritage Academies, headquartered in Grand Rapids,
Michigan, manages charter schools across the United States.257 I
examined five NHA schools located in North Carolina, including
254. How the Grinch Stole Christmas! (TV Movie 1966)—Quotes, IMDB, http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0060345/quotes (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
255. See Marion Wang, When Charter Schools Are Nonprofit in Name Only, PRO
PUBLICA (Dec. 9, 2014, 11:49 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/when-charterschools-are-nonprofit-in-name-only [hereinafter Wang II] (arguing similarly situated
schools in Ohio fired and sued their for-profit management firm but had difficulty
continuing because they had turned over most of their assets to the for-profits and had
little left with which to relaunch the schools).
256. See Lynn Bonner, NC Audit Finds Financial Mismanagement at Closed Charter
School: Ex-CEO Disputes Findings, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Jan. 28, 2015),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2015/01/28/4512207/audit-finds-financialmismanagement.
html (reporting on alleged mismanagement of a North Carolina charter school).
257. See School Directory, NAT’L HERITAGE ACAD., https://www.nhaschools.com/en
/Our-Schools/Pages/School-Directory.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
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Forsyth Academy, Greensboro Academy, PreEminent Charter
Academy, Queens Grant Community School, and Research Triangle
Academy. The second for-profit company, Charter Schools USA
(“CSUSA”), is located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida and manages
schools in seven different states.258 I examined three CSUSA schools
in North Carolina, including Cabarrus Charter Academy, Cardinal
Charter Academy, and Langtree Charter Academy. The following
discussion, which is based on my review of thousands of pages of
documents that each company supplied in response to my public
records requests,259 analyzes the school clusters separately since their
management practices differ from one another. However, because the
management practices of the schools within each cluster are
practically identical, the analysis for the most part treats each cluster
as a single unit. I begin with the NHA cluster of schools.
1. Description of Financial and Management Practices of Schools
Managed by National Heritage Academies and Charter Schools USA
The most noteworthy aspect of the relationship between NHA
and its North Carolina charter schools is that it is governed by what
the industry calls “sweeps” contracts.260 The term “sweeps” refers to
the fact that practically every dollar that comes from public sources
into the nonprofit charter-holding corporations is instantaneously
swept out of their bank accounts and deposited into NHA’s.261 In
exchange, NHA undertakes to provide the nonprofit charter-holder
with everything necessary to start and run a successful charter school:
curricula, teachers, teacher training, real estate,262 furniture,
258. See Our Schools, CHARTER SCH. USA, http://charterschoolsusa.com/our-schools/
(last visited Aug. 16, 2015).
259. See supra Introduction, Section C.
260. See Wang II, supra note 255 (employing and explaining the term sweeps contract).
261. See Management Agreement Between National Heritage Academies., Inc. and
Greensboro Academy art. V.A (May 18, 1999) [hereinafter Greensboro Acad. Mgmt.
Agreement] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Wang II, supra note 255.
262. See Greensboro Acad. Mgmt. Agreement, supra note 261, at art. III, IV. In
addition to the management contract, NHA enters into lease agreements with each of the
schools for the provision of its facilities. See Lease Agreement Between National Heritage
Academies. and Greensboro Academy, at Recitals (Oct. 7, 1999) [hereinafter Greensboro
Acad. Lease Agreement] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Technically, they
are subleases because NHA leases the facilities from its own property development
affiliate, Charter Development Company, LLC, and then subleases the property to the
school. Id. The lease terms make clear that if the school loses its charter or for any reason
terminates its relationship with NHA, the management company takes back the building
along with everything in it. Id. at art. 13. The tenant—meaning the charter school
nonprofit—pays all upkeep, utilities, taxes, and insurance. Id. at art. 5–7. This is
conceptually confusing, since in fact NHA takes all of the school’s revenue before the
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equipment, administrative support, accounting and financial services,
etc.263 Notably, practically everything leased or purchased under the
contract remains the property of NHA in case the contract is
terminated.264 Once NHA provides the promised goods and services,
it retains all leftover money as its management fee.265 Another
contract provision, one that at first blush appears innocuous,
acknowledges that NHA manages multiple charter schools, that there
are certain NHA administrative services that cannot easily be
attributed to a single school, and that NHA retains the right to
attribute these expenses to the various schools on whatever
reasonable basis it decides.266
The contract provides the charter-holding nonprofit organization
the right to hire an independent consulting firm to evaluate NHA’s
services, but any such consultation must be paid for out of board
discretionary funds.267 Given that the boards’ discretionary funds
amount to no more than $35,000 per year268 (out of a typical annual
budget of anywhere between $4 million and $6 million),269 and that,
based on my review of meeting minutes, the boards usually spend all
of those funds on sports coaches and equipment, after-school
enrichment programs, conference travel, teacher recognition, karaoke
machines, furniture for the parent lounge, and countless other
purposes, the right to hire an outside consultant seems mostly

school gets its hands on it, and pays itself for rent and upkeep. Id. at art. 3. Under
Paragraph 3.5 of the lease, the nonprofit also agrees that if NHA makes capital
improvements to the property, it may raise the rent to compensate itself. Id. at art. 3, para.
5. In sum, under the terms of the lease there is virtually no way for NHA to lose. It takes
the organization’s money, pays itself whatever it wants in rent, and reimburses itself for
any and all real-estate-related expenses. Id.
263. Wang II, supra note 255.
264. Greensboro Acad. Mgmt. Agreement, supra note 261, at art. VII.B.2. However,
under the agreement, “[a]ssets owned by the Academy shall remain the property of the
Academy.” Id.
265. See id. at art. V.C.
266. Id. at art. V.E.
267. Id. at art. IV.F.
268. See National Heritage Academies Draft Services Agreement art. VII.D (Apr. 13,
2012) [hereinafter NHA Draft Services Agreement], available at http://www
.ncpublicschools.org/docs/charterschools/resources/application/2014apps/summerfield.pdf
(depicting a model management agreement submitted as part of NHA’s charter
application to the North Carolina Office of Charter Schools for Summerfield Charter
Academy). Additionally, under the agreement, the board’s discretionary account is
defined as $35,000 or two percent of per-pupil allocations. Id.
269. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 14, 2006) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (projecting an annual budget of $4.4 million);
Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Feb. 11, 2014) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (projecting an annual budget of approximately $5.5 million).
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theoretical. In my review of thousands of pages of board documents, I
never saw evidence that any board member considered bringing in an
outside expert or otherwise engaging in any form of neutral
evaluation or comparative shopping.
Either party may terminate the management contract upon
ninety days’ notice.270 However, as was true with the RBA-managed
schools, the contract’s “Grinch” provision ensures that the nonprofit
organizations would commit institutional suicide if they were to
exercise the termination right since practically all school-related
property would remain with NHA.271
The management contract between NHA and its charters
requires NHA to keep the schools’ boards of directors reasonably
informed of the school’s operations so that the boards can provide
oversight.272 In many respects, NHA appears to honor this
commitment. Based on my review of years’ worth of board minutes at
different NHA-managed schools, most board meetings include a
Principal’s Report in which the school principal, who invariably is an
NHA employee, provides directors an overview of important
developments since the previous meeting.273 NHA also regularly
provides copies of school-related policies and procedures and seeks
directors’ approval. In recent years, the company has involved the
directors in personnel decisions by furnishing applicants’ resumes and
employment questionnaires and seeking directors’ approval. Also in
recent years, NHA has created an online School Performance
Dashboard Suite that gives directors access to current statistics about
school enrollment, school achievement, and parent satisfaction,
among other metrics.274 Most board meetings also include discussions
and votes related to the expenditure of the board’s discretionary
funds.275 Significantly, some meeting minutes record the presence of a
270. NHA Draft Servs. Agreement, supra note 268, at art. II.B.3.
271. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., Greensboro Acad. Mgmt. Agreement, supra note 261, at art. III.A, V.F
(requiring NHA to remain generally accountable to the board and to furnish the board
with regular financial reports).
273. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 14, 2014) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (including a Principal’s Report and a School
Performance Report).
274. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. Of Dirs. (Aug. 13, 2013) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (referring to the School Performance
Dashboard Suite).
275. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Apr. 5, 2001) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board funds for
purchase of a kiln); Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Feb. 3, 2000) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board discretionary
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lawyer, who presumably would be available to answer questions if the
board members had any.276
At first blush, NHA also appears to furnish each school’s board
members with thorough and timely financial information. In the late
spring of each school year, a NHA finance officer presents each
school’s board with a projected budget for the following school
year.277 That proposed budget is then revised periodically throughout
the school year to reflect changes in revenues and expenses.278 In
addition, the finance officer provides quarterly financial reports
showing year-to-date revenue and expense figures.279
However, after examining scores of such finance reports that
stretch over more than a decade, I was struck by two serious
shortcomings. First, there is virtually no indication that any director
ever asked any question about the figures presented in the reports.
Second, over time, the reports themselves became more and more

funds for a karaoke system); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs.
(Oct. 5, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of
several $500 coaching stipends); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs.
(Oct. 4, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of
board funds for craft materials); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs.
(Apr. 5, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of
board funds for athletic equipment, a laminating machine, and conferences); Board
Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 4, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board funds for “shelving”); Board
Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (June 1, 2000) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board funds for flags, flagpoles, and
conference travel); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Oct. 7, 1999)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (approving the spending of board
discretionary funds on musical instruments).
276. It raises an interesting ethical issue, one beyond the scope of this Article, whether
the attorney can in fact provide disinterested advice to the board of directors, particularly
when that advice might be adverse to the interests of NHA. After all, NHA pays all of the
bills for the charter school and, under the management contract, has extremely broad
discretion to decide whom to pay. Still, in at least a few instances, the attorney appeared to
provide directors with independent advice. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro
Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (July 1, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (recording
an attorney’s advice to the directors to be sure they record any objections or questions in
the corporate minutes).
277. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (June 1, 2000)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting the board with a proposed
budget for the 2000–2001 fiscal year).
278. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 4, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting the board a revised 2000–2001
fiscal year budget).
279. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Mar. 2, 2000)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting the board with a quarterly
financial update).
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confusing and opaque, particularly if one were trying to determine
exactly how much revenue was going to NHA.280
For example, in the early years of NHA’s operations in North
Carolina, its normal financial report consisted of a statement of
revenues and expenses that included an expense line item identified
as “Purchased Management Services – National Heritage
Academies.”281 A reasonable director reading that report would
assume that line was the total amount that NHA charged for the
various administrative services it provided. If the director were aware
that NHA was also the school’s landlord,282 he would rightly assume
that money was also going to NHA. Most of the other categories in
the report were self-explanatory, such as salaries and benefits for
teachers.
But as time went on, and as total revenues at the NHA-managed
schools grew to many millions, the financial reports became
increasingly convoluted as the number of budget line items multiplied
and their descriptors grew increasingly vague. By July of 2001, the
budgets included the category “Central Services,”283 which gave rise
to the subcategories “Data Processing,” “Staff/Personnel Services,”
and “Other Central Services.”284 There also appeared a category
named “Business Support Services,” which included “Fiscal Services”
and “Internal Services.”285 By the mid-2000s, the reports contained so
many vague line items that an outside observer would have little idea
what the money was actually being spent on, and a nonprofit director
examining the same documents would be in the same position unless
she asked aggressive clarifying questions.286 And yet, there is no
evidence that directors asked any such questions.287
280. See Wang II, supra note 255 (arguing it is hard for charter school boards to follow
the money when nearly all of it goes into the accounts of a private company).
281. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Aug. 12, 1999)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (referring to the $197,293 allocated to
purchased management services).
282. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Revised Budget for 2001–2002, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (June 6,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (including Central Services in the
Expenditures column).
284. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (May 15, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
285. See, e.g., id.
286. Eventually, NHA’s Director of Accounting began circulating a memorandum with
each financial report that purported to explain the budget line items. See, e.g., Board
Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (May 8, 2007) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (including an explanatory memo by Kathy Schmidt, Director of
School Accounting). However, they shed little light on what the money was actually being
spent on and no light on how the charges were determined. Id. For example, the memo
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Even if a director were able to discover precise meanings for
these fuzzy line items, she would have little or no idea how NHA
arrived at the reported figures. As indicated earlier, all of the
nonprofit organization’s revenues are swept into NHA’s bank
account, and the only expense information the board gets back is
whatever NHA tells it the goods and services cost. A director could
ask NHA to explain how much the company actually spent for a
particular good or service, or even how much profit NHA reaped as a
result of a particular transaction, but NHA would be under no
obligation, contractual or legal, to reveal that information. As
mentioned earlier, obtaining a clear picture of where the money is
going is further hampered by the fact that the management contract
explicitly permits NHA to attribute the expenses of shared backoffice services to any of its schools, so long as the attribution is
“reasonable.”288
In the years’ worth of meeting minutes and budget reports I
reviewed, a troubling pattern emerged. In the spring, NHA would
present to the school’s board a projected budget for the following
school year. Once the school year began, NHA would introduce
amended budgets, and, more often than not, report an increase in
total revenues as a result of healthier-than-projected student
enrollment or the acquisition of grants. Along with the increase in
revenue, NHA’s amended budgets would show significant increases in
the dollar figures attached to the fuzzy expense line items. So, for
example, in the amended budget, the “Internal Services” line item
might increase by tens of thousands of dollars. In most such cases, it
was impossible to conjure an explanation of why an increase in total
revenues would lead to a big increase in spending on “Internal
Services.”289

explains “State and Federal Relations” as “central services for governmental relations,
partner services, and intervention services.” Id. The category “Business and Internal
Services” is explained as being “for finance, payroll, compliance monitoring, facilities
management, and real estate acquisition.” Id. Query why a school that is forking over a
huge monthly lease payment to NHA should be billed for “real estate acquisition.”
“Central Services” is explained as “central services for people services, people
development, technology, and research and development.” Id.
287. See Wang II, supra note 255 (arguing that state auditors in New York examined
the finances of an NHA-managed school in Buffalo and determined that although the
school’s board approved overall budgets, it appeared to accept the company’s numbers
with few questions so that its signoff was “essentially meaningless”).
288. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (May 8, 2007) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting a final revised budget for the 2006–
2007 fiscal year that raised estimated total revenues from $4.8 million to $5.2 million and
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Perhaps there are legitimate business justifications, but if so,
nothing on the record indicates that NHA shared these justifications
with the nonprofit directors. Of course, the vague line items and
frequently shifting dollar amounts also would be consistent with
NHA’s desire to create “slush” categories that, in combination with
its flexibility to attribute shared expenses to whichever schools it
chooses, would permit it to mask situations where it was amassing
eye-popping profits.290

distributed the excess through various vague administrative budget categories); Board
Meeting Minutes, Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 14, 2006) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (presenting a revised projected budget for the 2006–2007 fiscal year
with total revenue increasing from approximately $4.4 million to approximately $4.8
million and increases in several of the vague administrative categories including “Central
Support Services” alone increasing from $161,000 to $195,000); Board Meeting Minutes,
Forsyth Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 4, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(presenting a revised budget for the 2000–2001 fiscal year in which total revenue increased
from approximately $2.6 million to approximately $2.9 million and the excess was
distributed through various vague administrative budget categories); Board Meeting
Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (May 13, 2014) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (presenting financial reports indicating that the final amended budget for
the 2013–2014 fiscal year increased from $5.5 million to $5.7 million and that the excess
funds were spent on, among other things, “Central Services”); Board Meeting Minutes,
Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Apr. 5, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (including a year-end budget report for the 2004–2005 fiscal year, showing that
the original projected budget was approximately $4.3 million; by year-end, actual revenues
were approximately $4.5 million. The excess was sprinkled through “Executive
Administration,” “Business Administration,” and “Central Administration,” and “Central
Administration” alone increased, for no obvious reason, by $36,000); Board Meeting
Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Dec. 7, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (revealing year-end spending figures substantially above the projected
amounts and where the extra funds were distributed into budget categories such as
“Executive Administration” and “Central Services”); Board Meeting Minutes,
PreEminent Charter Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 14, 2011) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (presenting the board with an amended budget that increased projected
revenue by approximately $155,000 and distributed the excess through various vague
administrative categories); Board Meeting Minutes, Queens Grant Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Dirs.
(May 15, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting a final revised
budget for the 2007–2008 fiscal year revealing that projected revenue increased from
approximately $5.3 million to approximately $5.7 million and that several vague
administrative categories increased markedly, including an increase of more than $50,000
for “Central Services”).
290. In recent years, NHA has begun “invoicing” its schools for the services it
provides. I can only assume they have taken to this practice in hopes of cementing the
perception that the school is paying for concrete and valuable services that NHA is
providing. However, as far as I can tell, those invoices serve no useful purpose. They
simply parrot the line items, including the same apparent slush categories, contained in the
financial reports. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. Of Dirs. (Sept.
10, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (including three invoices from the
NHA).
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To take one illustrative example, board minutes from the
November 5, 2002, meeting at Greensboro Academy reveal that
NHA presented a revised budget for the 2002–2003 school year that
increased projections of total revenue by approximately $142,000 as a
result of greater than expected enrollment.291 The remainder of the
budget projection sprinkles most of that windfall through various
vague line items so that “Executive Administration” increased by
$63,000, “Business Support Services” increased by $19,000, and the
illusive “Central Services” increased by $34,000, all without any
explanation of why those expense categories would increase
significantly as a result of the addition of a relative handful of
students.292
One budget item that would be difficult for NHA to obscure is
lease payments to NHA in exchange for providing school facilities.
From the perspective of NHA, the lease arrangements constitute
what my friends from the entrepreneurial business sector would refer
to as a brilliant “real estate play” because there is virtually no way for
NHA to lose. Technically, NHA leases the facilities from its own
property development affiliate, Charter Development Company,
LLC, and then subleases the property to the charter school.293 The
terms of the lease make clear that if the school loses its charter294 or
for any reason terminates the management agreement, NHA takes
back the real estate along with everything attached to it.295 According
to other lease terms, the tenant—meaning the charter school
nonprofit—pays all maintenance,296 repair,297 utilities,298 taxes,299 and
insurance.300 The terms that require the tenant to pay expenses are, of
291. Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 5, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
292. See id.; see also Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Sept. 10,
2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reflecting a similar increase in
projected total revenues and corresponding increases in expenses attributed to vague line
items); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Apr. 5, 2005) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (similar); Board Meeting Minutes, Greensboro
Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Dec. 7, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (similar).
293. See, e.g., Greensboro Acad. Lease Agreement, supra note 262, at Recitals para. A
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (indicating that Charter Development
Company, LLC is the property’s owner and that it has entered into a Master Lease with
NHA).
294. See id. at para. 13.1.E.
295. Id. at para. 13.2.
296. Id. at para. 9.1.
297. Id. at para. 8.1.
298. Id. at para. 5.1.
299. Id. at para. 6.1.
300. Id. at para. 7.1.
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course, conceptually confusing since in fact NHA takes all of the
nonprofit’s revenue before the school ever gets its hands on it, and
pays itself301—in effect taking money out of one of its pockets and
shifting it to another—for rent, maintenance, and all other
expenses.302 Under another provision of the lease, the nonprofit also
agrees that if NHA makes capital improvements to the property, it
may raise the rent to compensate itself.303 Thus, under the terms of
the lease between NHA and its charter schools, there is virtually no
way for NHA to lose money. It takes the nonprofit organization’s
money, pays itself whatever it wants in rent (thereby eliminating any
debt it incurred in constructing the facility), and reimburses itself for
any and all real-estate-related expenses.
Not surprisingly, available evidence points toward significant
real-estate-related profits. In some instances, the schools pay rents
approaching $1 million per year.304 When maintenance and other
expenses are added on, the charges can be upwards of $1.2 million per
year.305 Tax records for PreEminent Charter Academy, a NHAmanaged school in North Carolina, furnish evidence of generous
profits reaped by NHA. Those records indicate that the land for the
school was purchased from the previous owners in 2002 for
$180,000.306 A construction permit was issued for the same parcel in
June 2002 for a building valued at $2.9 million, which apparently was
completed in April 2003.307 In 2003, PreEminent Charter School

301. Another provision of the lease is fascinatingly convoluted. Paragraph 2.1 states
that “[p]ursuant to the terms of the Management Agreement between [NHA] and
Tenant[], NHA is providing the leased facilities and Tenant has assigned all costs to be
paid by Tenant under the terms of this Lease to NHA, which assignment shall remain in
effect . . . . ” Id. at para. 2.1. If my law students turned in such a provision, I would tell
them to rewrite it in comprehensible language. What it appears to mean is that the parties
acknowledge that the Management Agreement between the charter school and NHA
provides NHA with the right to use the nonprofit’s money to pay itself for providing the
real estate.
302. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text (explaining “sweeps” contracts).
303. Greensboro Acad. Lease Agreement, supra note 262, at para. 3.5.
304. See, e.g., Ninth Amendment to Lease Agreement Between National Heritage
Academy, Inc. and Greensboro Academy, Inc. (May 22, 2008) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (establishing annual rent for the school facility at $977,760).
305. See, e.g., Greensboro Academy, Proposed Initial Budget for the 2008–2009 School
Year, (Apr. 14, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (showing a projected
annual expense of $1.34 million for Operations and Maintenance).
306. Account Summary for 3815 Rock Quarry Road, WAKE COUNTY REAL EST. DATA,
http://services.wakegov.com/realestate/Account.asp?id=0067665&stype=owner&owner
=BTYPE-Charter+Development+Company&spg=1 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
307. Assessment Notes for 3815 Rock Quarry Road, WAKE COUNTY REAL EST. DATA,
http://services.wakegov.com/realestate/Notes.asp?id=0067665&cd=01&loc=3815++ROCK
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began paying annual rent for that facility at the level of $813,120.308
For several years thereafter, annual rent settled at approximately
$772,000,309 but, effective in 2013, rose to $814,560.310 All this time, of
course, NHA was exercising its right under the lease and management
agreements to pay itself for providing all maintenance and repair.311
Given the apparently modest cost of acquisition and construction and
the large, ongoing rent payments from PreEminent to NHA, which
appear to have totaled more than $6 million over a period of eight
years, one could reasonably speculate that NHA’s real estate
development costs were long ago paid off, that the stream of
payments now constitutes healthy profit, and that there is no end in
sight for the good times that NHA is enjoying.
This was the conclusion of a Detroit Free Press investigative
series that focused on NHA’s business practices.312 According to the
report, NHA typically fronts the money to build or renovate charter
schools and rapidly recoups its investment through rents charged to
the schools.313 Those rents, invariably paid with a secure stream of
public dollars, generally do not decrease even after NHA has
recovered its initial investment.314 To compound the problem, there is
evidence that the monthly and yearly rents NHA charges are, at least
in some instances, above market rate.315

+QUARRY+RD&des=PROP+OF+CHARTER+DEVELOPMENT+CO+LLC+BM2002
-01374&pin=1722460857 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
308. First Amendment to Lease Agreement Between National Heritage Academy, Inc.
and PreEminent Charter School (May 12, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
309. Fourth Amendment to Lease Agreement Between National Heritage Academy
and PreEminent Charter School (May 22, 2006) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (establishing annual rent at $772,640).
310. Tenth Amendment to Lease Agreement Between National Heritage Academy
and PreEminent Charter School (effective July 1, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
311. See supra notes 296–304 and accompanying text.
312. Dixon, supra note 253.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Martha Thierry, Graphic: National Heritage Academy’s Rents Exceed What Most
Experts Say are Reasonable, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 21, 2014), http://archive.freep.com
/interactive/article/20140622/NEWS06/140621006/Graphic-National-Heritage-Academy-srents-exceed-what-most-experts-say-reasonable; see also Wang II, supra note 255 (arguing
that New York state auditors concluded that Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School, run by
NHA, was paying above-market rent for its building).
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2. Description of Financial and Management Practices of Schools
Managed by Charter Schools USA
In some respects, CSUSA’s management practices are similar to
those of NHA. Based on my review of their meeting minutes, boards
of directors meet regularly, receive updates on school performance
and parent satisfaction, and approve policies and procedures drafted
or amended by CSUSA staff. The boards have at least some
involvement in hiring decisions, though they do not receive detailed
information about job applicants, and their approvals often appear
perfunctory. To a greater extent than the NHA or RBA schools, the
boards at CSUSA-managed schools appear to benefit from
independent legal advice.316 As with NHA, the schools’ directors
receive periodic financial reports that could only be fully understood
if board members were asking detailed questions. As with NHA,
there is little evidence that directors ever pose such questions.
However, CSUSA’s standard management contract is different
from NHA’s in several respects and in general is less controlling. To
begin, it is not a sweeps contract,317 although CSUSA does have
unfettered access to the nonprofit schools’ checking accounts.318
CSUSA takes a flat management fee defined as fifteen percent of
total revenues.319 Also unlike NHA, the contract provides that at least
some equipment and materials purchased for the school become the
school’s property, meaning the school would be left with some
education-related equipment if the management contract were
terminated.320 The contract’s default and termination provisions are
more stringent than those of NHA.321 Instead of granting either party
the right to terminate the management contract upon ninety-days’
notice (a right that, as explained above, is largely illusory because of
the “Grinch” problem),322 CSUSA’s contract carefully defines default,

316. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Cabarrus Charter Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Jan. 22,
2014) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (indicating the school’s lawyer
recommended changes to the real estate development contract between the school and
CSUSA’s real estate affiliate, Red Apple Development).
317. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text.
318. Charter Management Agreement Between Charter School USA and the North
Carolina Charter Education Foundation, Inc. art. V, para. A (Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter
Charter Mgmt. Agreement Between Charter Sch. USA and the N.C. Charter Educ.
Found., Inc.] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
319. Id. at art. V, para. E.
320. Id. at art. III, para. D.
321. See id. at art. VII.
322. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text.
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requires an opportunity to cure, and permits termination only if those
terms are not met.323
When applying for new North Carolina charters, CSUSA has
addressed state regulators’ concerns about the control it wields over
schools by repeating the mantra that their relationship is subject to a
“performance based contract.”324 By this they mean that the
management contract requires them to perform a broad array of
services, and that the contract’s default provisions permit the schools
to terminate the contracts if those obligations are not met. For two
reasons, this answer is dissatisfying. First, it is true of most contracts
that performance is due from both parties and that one may terminate
if the other fails to perform. There is nothing special or different
about these CSUSA management contracts. Second, the contract’s
definition of nonperformance is narrow and does not include
language that would permit the schools to simply decide that they
were not getting a good enough deal and wanted to look elsewhere
for their management functions.325
From a nonprofit law perspective, the most troubling aspect of
CSUSA’s relationship with its schools involves real estate. CSUSA’s
real estate development affiliate, Red Apple Development, owns the
North Carolina charter schools’ facilities, and there is at least some
evidence to indicate that CSUSA attempted to conceal from state and
federal authorities the fact that the schools’ EMO would also, in
effect, be their landlord. For example, when the nonprofit
corporation responsible for Cabarrus Charter Academy filed its IRS
Form 1023 seeking 501(c)(3) status, it responded to a question about
real estate development by saying “[i]t is anticipated that a school
[facility] will be constructed and financed by a private developer on
the site, who will in turn lease the facility to the Academy.”326 In
response to another specific question about how Cabarrus would
ensure that its facility would be developed under a market-rate, arms-

323. Charter Mgmt. Agreement Between Charter Sch. USA and the N.C. Charter
Educ. Found., Inc., supra note 318, at art. VII.
324. Charter School Application for 2013: Cabarrus Charter Academy, N.C. Charter
Educ. Found., Inc. 41 (Apr. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Cabarrus Charter Application],
available at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/charterschools/resources/application
/2014apps/cabarruscharter.pdf.
325. Charter Mgmt. Agreement Between Charter Sch. USA and the N.C. Charter
Educ. Found., Inc., supra note 318, at art. VII.
326. The N.C. Charter Found., Inc., IRS Form 1023, Application for Recognition of
Exemption pt. IV (OMB No. 1545-0056) (2013).
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length transaction, the school simply did not answer, though the
Form’s instructions clearly required it to do so.327
Similarly, in Cabarrus Charter Academy’s charter application to
the North Carolina Office of Charter Schools, it responded to a
question about school facilities by claiming that a “private developer”
would construct the buildings and that the name of the landlord was
unknown.328 Worse yet, the North Carolina charter application filed
by Cardinal Charter Academy explicitly claimed that the facility
would not be owned by the management company and that it would
be constructed and financed by a “third party” who would rent it to
the school.329 It further asserted that the lease agreement would be
“independent of the Board’s management agreement.”330 These
responses are at best disingenuous, since the questions clearly are
intended to ferret out whether the management company is also
going to be the landlord, and that all of CSUSA’s charter-related real
estate transactions followed an established pattern that result in its
affiliate, Red Apple, leasing the properties to the schools,331 and
reaping what appears to be very healthy returns.332 It may also be
327. See id. at pt. VIII, Question 7a & Sched. B, § 1, Question 7 (asking “will persons
other than your employees or volunteers develop your facilities” and requiring a detailed
explanation if the answer is yes).
328. Cabarrus Charter Application, supra note 324, at 149.
329. NC Charter School Application for School Opening 2014: Cardinal Charter
Academy, N.C. Charter Educ. Found., Inc. 28 (Mar. 1, 2013) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
330. Id.
331. The pattern is that the schools’ initial real estate development is undertaken by
Ryan Companies, US, which is a large international construction firm. See generally RYAN
COMPANIES, http://www.ryancompanies.com/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). Ryan enters into
a twenty-year commercial “triple net lease” (meaning, in essence, the tenant pays all
expenses) with the charter-holding nonprofit. See Lease Agreement by and Between Ryan
Co. US, Inc. and North Carolina Charter Education Foundation, Inc. art. II, para. 3–4; art.
III para. 2; art. V; art. VI, para. 1 (Nov. 23, 2012) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Soon thereafter, Ryan conveys the property to Red Apple Development, which
steps into Ryan’s shoes and assumes the lease. Our Schools, RED APPLE DEV.,
http://www.redappledevelopment.com/our-schools/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). There
could be perfectly valid business justifications for structuring the transaction in this way,
but, from the perspective of CSUSA, it also has the advantageous result of making its
assertions about a “third party” developing and renting school facilities to the charter
schools at least technically true. It also means that neither Red Apple’s nor CSUSA’s
name is associated with the schools’ real estate development during the crucial period
when they are being closely examined by state and federal regulators.
332. See Cabarrus Charter Application, supra note 324, at 138 (projecting that
Cabarrus would be paying $1.9 million in rent/lease expenses by year five of its existence);
see also Lease Agreement by and Between Ryan Co. US, Inc. and North Carolina Charter
Education Foundation, Inc., supra note 331, at art. II (showing a schedule of rent
payments that begins modestly at $80,000 per year, but ends in year twenty with annual
payments of $1.8 million).
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worth pointing out that none of the documents that CSUSA provided
to me revealed the role played by Red Apple. The only reason I
discovered Red Apple’s involvement is that I checked the real estate
records in the relevant counties.
Given this information about CSUSA’s involvement with charter
school real estate, it should not be surprising that others have focused
on the same issue and have found what they consider to be improper
behavior. One recent investigative report in Florida, where CSUSA is
headquartered and runs numerous charter schools, alleged that
CSUSA earns tens of millions of dollars a year by acting as,
essentially, a real estate firm.333 An investigation by the Florida
League of Women Voters came to a similar conclusion.334
To summarize, NHA, by means of the management contracts it
enters into with North Carolina nonprofit charter-holding
corporations, sweeps millions of public dollars into its own coffers
every year and reveals little about precisely how that money is spent
and how much of it goes to corporate profits rather than the provision
of public education. Under the terms of their lease arrangements with
charter schools, both NHA and CSUSA (as well as RBA) engage in
what appear to be highly lucrative real estate deals that permit them
to obtain ownership of valuable properties using public funds and
charge charter-holding nonprofits rent (possibly above-market rent)
long after their acquisition-related debts are paid off. Because the
management organizations own the schools’ real estate (and, in the
case of RBA and NHA, practically everything else the schools need
to function), the schools’ boards of directors are virtually powerless to
fire them or otherwise alter the relationships.
3. The Application of Nonprofit Legal Doctrines to Schools Managed
by National Heritage Academies and Charter Schools USA
Although the foregoing discussion may make some readers
queasy—particularly if they pay taxes in North Carolina—NHA and
CSUSA doubtless would respond that nothing in the state’s charter
school legislation explicitly prohibits such management and financial
practices. They would be correct, but they would also be ignoring the

333. Jeff Bryant, Charter Schools Don’t Need an Ad Campaign; They Need Regulation,
CAMPAIGN FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://ourfuture.org/20140828
/charter-schools-dont-need-an-ad-campaign-they-need-regulation; see also Noah Pransky,
Charter Schools Making Big Profits for Private Companies, WTSP (Tampa, Fla. Aug. 2,
2014), http://www.wtsp.com/story/news/investigations/2014/08/21/charter-school-profitson-real-estate/14420317/ (describing the business model of CSUSA).
334. See L EAGUE OF WOMEN V OTERS OF FLA., supra note 9, at 7–12.
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application of state and federal nonprofit law to charter schools and
their management. This discussion begins by specifying which of the
nonprofit legal doctrines discussed in Part I do not apply to NHA’s
and CSUSA’s management practices.
Private inurement does not apply because that doctrine forbids
nonprofit corporate insiders from lining their pockets with charitable
assets.335 Among the schools managed by NHA and CSUSA, there
may be diversion of charitable assets taking place, but there is no
evidence that corporate insiders, such as nonprofit board members,
are skimming money themselves or colluding with others to do so.
Similarly, because neither NHA nor CSUSA is a DQP336 with respect
to the charter-holding nonprofits, they will not be subject to
intermediate sanctions penalties.337 Finally, the state law fiduciary
duty of loyalty covers much the same ground as private inurement
and intermediate sanctions, and for similar reasons, is inapplicable
here. That, however, still leaves the private benefit doctrine (along
with its close cousin the operational test) and the state law fiduciary
duties of obedience and care.
a.

Operational Test and Private Benefit Doctrine

NHA- and CSUSA-managed schools should be concerned about
failing the IRS’s operational test and thereby losing their 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status. The test asks whether more than an insubstantial
part of a given charity’s activities are in furtherance of something
other than its charitable purpose.338 Because the operational test, like
many IRS doctrines, is guided by a vague “all the factors” analysis,339
it is difficult to determine in advance whether the NHA- and CSUSAmanaged schools have crossed the line into noncompliance, but there
is sufficient evidence available to assume that both are in peril. Given
that NHA manages its schools under a sweeps contract and thereby
335. See supra Section II.B.1.a.
336. See supra Section II.B.1.a.
337. As discussed in Section III.A.2.a, RBA and its for-profit affiliate companies can
be considered DQPs in relation to its charter-holding nonprofit due to Mitchell’s
involvement with the nonprofit’s board of directors. In contrast, no individuals on NHA’s
or CSUSA’s boards are owners of the for-profit companies that manage them. Once again,
however, I would invite others to make the argument that the for-profit management
companies, especially NHA, should qualify as insiders by virtue of their comprehensive
contractual control over the schools they manage. Such an argument, while intriguing, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
338. See supra Section II.B.2.
339. See HOPKINS, supra note 74, at 79 (arguing that the operational test question of
whether an organization has a substantial nonexempt purpose is a question of fact based
on all the available evidence).
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controls virtually every aspect of their operations and finances, given
that its financial reports are opaque and that it is virtually impossible
to determine how much of the public’s money is being diverted into
corporate profits, and given that there is little evidence that the
schools’ boards of directors have bothered to investigate that
question, there are grounds to believe that a substantial portion of the
nonprofit schools’ activities and resources are being devoted to
noncharitable purposes—namely generating profits for NHA. The
case is weaker for CSUSA-managed schools, both because their
boards appear to be more engaged and because the evidence of
troubling profiteering is confined to the realm of real estate.340
This group of charter schools and their for-profit management
companies should also be concerned about the application of the
IRS’s private benefit doctrine, which, similar to the operational test,
asks whether a charitable organization’s benefits are more than
incidentally flowing to private individuals outside the charitable
class.341 There is ample evidence indicating that the financial benefits
flowing to CSUSA, and especially to NHA, are quantitatively
substantial.342 NHA, through its management contracts and leases,
maintains almost complete control over its schools’ operations and
finances. The “Grinch” clauses343 render it virtually certain that the
boards will not challenge NHA’s control no matter what percentage
of the charitable dollars it takes for itself. Although no one will know
how extensive NHA’s profits are until and unless legal authorities
compel them to disclose that information, the schools’ budgets
indicate that NHA’s management fee combined with its real estate
profits amounts to millions of dollars annually.344 In the case of
CSUSA, there is at least some evidence to indicate that it is receiving
substantial economic benefits as a result of the real estate its affiliate
leases to the schools it manages.345 As discussed in Section II.B.2.b,
above, demonstrating a private benefit violation does not require
proof that benefits are flowing to outsiders at above-market rates,
only that they are substantial and that they are ending up with
individuals who are not part of the charitable class.346

340. See supra notes 317–31 and accompanying text.
341. See supra Section II.B.2.b.
342. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing quantitative and qualitative
substantial benefit).
343. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 290–312 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 326–34 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Section II.B.2.b.
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Likewise, there is evidence to prove that the benefits flowing to
CSUSA, and especially to NHA, are qualitatively substantial. As in
the credit-counseling cases discussed in Section II.B.2.b, the nonprofit
charter-holding organizations have off-loaded substantial portions of
their operations to for-profit providers when there is no reason to
believe that the schools could not provide those services themselves
in a more efficient and cost-effective manner.347 In the case of NHA,
with its sweeps contracts, one could argue that the boards handed the
schools’ keys over to the for-profit company. The fact that there are
successful independently managed charter schools all across the state
belies any contention that these charter schools would not be able to
fulfill their charitable missions without resorting to the for-profit
organizations’ services, and that alone is sufficient to demonstrate
that the benefits are qualitatively substantial.348
b.

Fiduciary Duties of Obedience and Care

In addition to potentially engaging in violations of federal
nonprofit law, the NHA- and CSUSA-managed charters are in peril
of violating state fiduciary duties applicable in the nonprofit sphere.
Although it is unlikely that the North Carolina Office of the Attorney
General will intervene to enforce the fiduciary duties of the boards of
directors of the nonprofit charter-holding schools,349 there are
347. See supra Section II.B.2.b.
348. In the case of NHA, it is clear that the IRS had similar private-benefit concerns to
those expressed here. After at least two of its schools, Greensboro Academy and
PreEminent Charter Academy, had already begun operations, the IRS rejected their
initial 501(c)(3) applications, largely on private-benefit grounds. Based on the evidence,
the IRS feared that NHA would retain complete control over the schools and use that
control to funnel large profits to itself. The schools hired a high-priced Washington, D.C.
law firm, which produced point-by-point, extensive written rebuttals of the IRS’s legal
arguments. In addition to the exhaustive (and exhausting) legal arguments, NHA offered
to amend certain aspects of its management contract, including a clause that permitted
NHA to terminate the contract (and leave the schools with nothing) if the schools’ boards
interfered with NHA hiring decisions. As often happens when the IRS is confronted with
the prospect of pitched legal battle, it folded and granted 501(c)(3) status to the schools.
Compare Letter from Gerald V. Sack, IRS Manager of Exempt Org. Technical Grp. 4, to
Greensboro Acad. (Apr. 18, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(rejecting Greensboro Academy’s 501(c)(3) application largely on private benefit
grounds), with Letter from Celia Roady, Attorney Representing Greensboro Acad., to the
IRS (July 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (appealing the rejection
and offering to amend certain terms of the management contract), and Letter from Gerald
V Sack, IRS Manager of Exempt Org. Technical Grp. 4, to Greensboro Acad. (Aug. 7,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reversing the IRS’s earlier denial and
granting 501(c)(3) status). This Article suggests that, more than a decade later, the IRS
should take another close look.
349. See supra Section II.A.4 (discussing the North Carolina Attorney General’s lack
of enforcement resources).
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grounds to believe that directors at NHA and CSUSA are not
fulfilling them.
The duty of obedience requires directors to ensure that a
charitable organization’s resources are being used to serve its
charitable purposes.350 Among other things, directors should engage
in reasonable comparative shopping to ensure that the organization’s
money is being spent with reasonable efficiency.351 If close
examination reveals that board members are permitting significant
charitable assets—assets that might otherwise be used to improve or
expand charitable and educational services—to be diverted to
unreasonable corporate profits, the directors could be violating their
duty of obedience. For the schools described in this second category,
there is no evidence that directors are engaging in any sort of
comparative shopping, and there is at least some evidence that
financial resources are being unreasonably diverted from serving the
schools’ charitable and educational missions.
Likewise, the schools’ governance practices should be carefully
examined to determine if directors are adhering to their duty of care.
Directors at schools managed by NHA and CSUSA receive
reasonably detailed information about policies and procedures,
student achievement, parent satisfaction, personnel matters, and
other operational matters. They also receive periodic financial reports
that provide them up-to-date information about the schools’ gross
revenues and spending. However, particularly in the case of NHAmanaged schools, directors have no way of determining how NHA
formulates the expense figures that it reports and whether they are
accurate and reasonable. Nor do the directors have any way of
knowing what percentage of the schools’ resources is being taken as
profit by NHA. The duty of care would require them to at least ask.352
C.

Third Category: Charter Schools that Appear to Comply with
Nonprofit Law

Because rectitude is less interesting than controversy, this
discussion will be brief. In general, governance practices at the
independently managed charter schools in my sample,353 as well as the
schools managed by KIPP, a nonprofit management company, were
thorough, correct, and in compliance with nonprofit law. Their boards

350.
351.
352.
353.

See supra Section II.A.3.
See supra Section II.A.3.
See supra Section II.A.1 (explaining the fiduciary duty of care).
These schools are: Socrates Academy, Tiller School, and Woods Charter School.
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met regularly and kept reasonably detailed minutes.354 They tended to
have more directors than the boards of EMO-managed schools,355 and
they enhanced the governance capabilities of the directors by creating
numerous board committees.356 Some organize themselves as
membership nonprofit corporations, which usually means that
students’ parents vote each year to decide who serves on the board of
directors.357 Many of the organizations were models of transparency,
posting their board meeting minutes358 and other significant corporate
documents on their websites.359 A review of the minutes showed that
directors were privy to detailed financial information about the
organizations,360 regularly assessed multiple bids for vendors’

354. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Sept. 11, 2013) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing governance details and breaking
financial reports down into granular categories).
355. Compare Board of Directors, SOCRATES ACAD., http://www.socratesacademy.us
/~socrates/index.php/about-socrates/board-of-directors (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (listing
eight board members), and Tiller School Board of Directors, TILLER SCH., http://
tillerschool.org/board-of-directors/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (listing twelve board
members), with Our School Board, GREENSBORO ACAD., https://www.nhaschools.com
/schools/greensboro/en/About-Us/Pages/Our-School-Board.aspx (last visited Aug. 17,
2015) (listing five board members).
356. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, KIPP Gaston Coll. Preparatory Bd. of Dirs.
(Sept. 18, 2013) (referring to reports by the Finance and Governance committees); Board
of Directors Committees, SOCRATES ACAD., http://www.socratesacademy.us/~socrates
/index.php/about-socrates/board-of-directors/board-committees (last visited Aug. 17,
2015) (listing sixteen separate board committees).
357. See, e.g., BYLAWS OF THE TILLER SCHOOL OF CARTERET COUNTY, available at
http://tillerschool.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Tiller_School_Bylaws-RevisedDecember-2013.pdf (last revised Dec. 2013) (describing the school’s membership
structure).
358. See, e.g., School Board, WOODS CHARTER SCH., http://www.woodscharter.org
/school-board (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (posting board meeting minutes, bylaws, and
other corporate documents).
359. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 13, 2013) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review); Tiller Community Portal, TILLER SCH.,
http://tillerschool.org/community-portal/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2015) (posting corporate
bylaws and other key documents on their website).
360. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (June 11, 2014),
available at https://www.socratesacademy.us/images/pdf_files/meeting_minutes/June_14
_BOD_Binder-for_web.pdf (reporting budget figures that detail salaries of each
employee).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757 (2015)

2015]

CHARTER SCHOOLS & NONPROFIT LAW

1821

services,361 and properly identified and scrutinized potential conflicts
of interest.362
In short, a nonprofit law assessment of the governance practices
of schools falling into this third category leaves little to object to.
CONCLUSION
This Article raises serious questions about whether certain North
Carolina charter schools, which by statute must be nonprofit
organizations, are complying with state and federal nonprofit law.
The most troubling indications of noncompliance arise among schools
that are managed under contract by for-profit companies, also
referred to as EMOs.
Evidence points to nonprofit law violations among the cluster of
schools managed by Roger Bacon Academy (“RBA”). Federal
charity regulators should investigate in particular whether these
RBA-managed charter schools are violating the private inurement
and intermediate sanctions doctrines. State charity regulators should
determine whether two former directors (one of whom still serves as
the board’s secretary) who are affiliated with RBA violated their
fiduciary duties of loyalty toward the schools by engaging in selfdealing transactions. State authorities should also ask whether the
disinterested directors violated their duty of care by permitting what
arguably were conflict-of-interest transactions.
Charity regulators should also closely scrutinize the nonprofit
law compliance of two additional clusters of North Carolina EMOmanaged charter schools—one managed by National Heritage
Academies (“NHA”) and the other by Charter Schools USA
(“CSUSA”). Based on an assessment of years’ worth of board
meeting minutes and financial reports of NHA-managed schools, it is
arguable that NHA has perfected the art of appearing to furnish
nonprofit schools’ board members with detailed information about
governance and finances while in fact masking how the charitable
dollars are being spent and how much money NHA is taking as profit.
My analysis shows little if any evidence that board members at the

361. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Feb. 12, 2014) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing bids for work on the school’s HVAC
system); Board Meeting Minutes, Socrates Acad. Bd. of Dirs. (Oct. 9, 2013) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (comparing the costs and benefits of various purchasing
cards).
362. See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, KIPP Gaston Coll. Preparatory Bd. of Dirs.
(Aug. 21, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing one board
member’s possible conflict of interest).
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nonprofit charter schools have taken the necessary steps to
investigate whether the charitable dollars flowing through their
schools are being spent with reasonable efficiency. The fact that NHA
and its corporate affiliate own practically everything the schools need
to function, including their school facilities, renders it doubtful that
the nonprofit board members could terminate their management
agreements even if they did peek into NHA’s financial black box,
discover that they were getting a bad deal, and decide to make
changes. Concerning CSUSA, the worst that can be said is that it
collaborates with its affiliate, Red Apple Development, to make its
charter schools the subjects of lucrative “real estate plays.”
Combined, these facts point toward NHA- and CSUSA-managed
schools’ possible violations of the federal operational test and private
benefit doctrines and the North Carolina fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care.
To these potential nonprofit law violations, it is an insufficient
answer that the charter school students do well on standardized tests
and that parents generally are satisfied with the schools’ performance.
In all transactions between charitable organizations and for-profit
companies, the tax-paying public is a silent third party.363 The
citizenry subsidizes contributions to charitable organizations in the
form of charitable tax deductions. In the case of charter school funds,
the connection to the tax-paying public is even more immediate, since
the schools’ revenues are comprised almost entirely of tax revenues.
Tax-paying citizens rely on charity regulators—particularly the IRS
and the state attorneys general—to look out for their interests in the
charitable sector and to be sure that their money—the public’s
money—is not being diverted from charitable purposes into
nonincidental private profits.364 Given the evidence that has come to

363. See Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations and Those Who
Control Them: The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 141, 147–48
(1995) (arguing charities’ duties are to the public and attorneys general and the IRS are
responsible for protecting the public’s interests); Alice M. Maples, State Attorney General
Oversight of Nonprofit Healthcare Corporations: Have We Reached an Ideological
Impasse?, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 235, 237 (2007) (arguing that one of state attorneys generals’
most important roles is guarding the public’s interests in charitable assets).
364. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 77, at 226 (arguing that state attorneys
general represent the interests of the public by promoting accountability by charitable
organizations); N.C. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS, supra note 79, at 32 (arguing that
North Carolina nonprofit law empowers the Attorney General of North Carolina to
enforce compliance with nonprofit norms); James J. Fishman, The Development of
Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 639 (1985)
(arguing that, because most attorneys general devote meager resources to the task of
protecting the public’s interest in charitable organizations, the IRS has become the de
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light as a result of this and other inquiries, it is arguable that neither
the IRS nor the North Carolina Attorney General is fulfilling this
vitally important monitoring and enforcement function.
This Article has illuminated questions and potential problems
with the nonprofit legal compliance of certain North Carolina charter
schools and called upon charity regulators to investigate whether the
law is indeed being broken. The question remains whether, in
addition to investigating these specific incidents, lawmakers should
consider regulatory changes to ensure that such problems do not arise
in the future. The matter of regulating for-profit corporations’
involvement in charter schools will become all the more urgent when,
in the near future, for-profit managed virtual charter schools make
their debut in North Carolina.365
A thorough exploration of necessary charter school legal and
regulatory reforms is beyond the scope of this Article, but it
concludes by offering a few modest suggestions. The North Carolina
charter statute should be amended to:
(1) bar individuals associated with EMOs from serving as
directors or officers of any charter school their EMOs
manage;
(2) prohibit sweeps contracts;
(3) require each EMO to report regularly and in detail
how much money each school has paid to it and its
affiliates;
(4) require all charter schools to post on their websites
board minutes, board packets (including financial
reports), important corporate documents (articles of
incorporation, bylaws, and conflict-of-interest policies),
Forms 1023, and recent Forms 990;
(5) prohibit or restrict agreements between charter schools
and their EMOs’ affiliates for the provision of real and
facto watchdog); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the
Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 480–81
(2010) (arguing that in recent years the IRS has assumed additional responsibility for
protecting the public’s interests in charities).
365. See Lynn Bonner, Two Virtual Charter Schools on Track for North Carolina,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/12/17
/4411642/two-virtual-charter-schools-on.html (reporting the approval of two virtual
charter schools, one to be managed by K12, a for-profit company whose management
practices have been controversial in other states); see also ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH.
REFORM, supra note 16, at 11 (claiming that the academic track record of the online
charter school industry is “abysmal” and that there are widespread accounts of
profiteering and fraud).
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personal property to avoid the “Grinch” problem
whereby schools are stripped bare if they decide they
are dissatisfied with the EMO’s performance; and
(6) require charter school boards to have no fewer than
nine members (to avoid situations where three
members of a five-person board are required to review
and approve massive amounts of material at a given
board meeting).
While state regulators are working out the details of those
reforms, the IRS can focus on clarifying the private benefit doctrine
as it applies to charter schools. Based on what I have seen in my
North Carolina sample, the IRS should begin by drawing a bright line
and declaring that the combination of powers wielded by EMOs such
as National Heritage Academies—sweeps contracts combined with
ownership of practically all real and personal property used by the
schools—are flatly prohibited.

